1. Article 34(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that a judgment entered by a court of a Member State in the terms of an arbitral award does not constitute a ‘judgment’, within the meaning of that provision, where a judicial decision resulting in an outcome equivalent to the outcome of that award could not have been adopted by a court of that Member State without infringing the provisions and the fundamental objectives of that regulation, in particular as regards the relative effect of an arbitration clause included in the insurance contract in question and the rules on lis pendens contained in Article 27 of that regulation, and that, in that situation, the judgment in question cannot prevent, in that Member State, the recognition of a judgment given by a court in another Member State.

2. Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event that Article 34(3) of that regulation does not apply to a judgment entered in the terms of an arbitral award, the recognition or enforcement of a judgment from another Member State cannot be refused as being contrary to public policy on the ground that it would disregard the force of res judicata acquired by the judgment entered in the terms of an arbitral award.

3. [S]ince Regulation No 1215/2012 repealed and replaced Regulation No 44/2001, which itself replaced the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (…), as amended by successive conventions on the accession of new Member States to that convention, the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of one of those legal instruments also applies to those of the others, whenever those provisions may be regarded as equivalent (…).

1. A petition to set aside an arbitration award is a legal remedy combining features of an extraordinary remedy at law, especially a petition for the revival of the proceedings, and an action for the formation of law or legal relationship in which the claimant (petitioner) demands a state court to render a judgment on setting aside of an existing legal relationship established by an arbitration award. A state court’s judgment granting the petition is of a quashing nature, as in such a situation the state court can only set aside the arbitration award, and only insofar as demanded by the petitioner.

2. [G]rounds for setting aside an arbitration award are provided for in Art. 1206 of the PCPC. It clearly follows from Art. 1206 of the PCPC that the list of the grounds for a petition to set aside an arbitration award contained therein is of an exhaustive character. Cognition of a state court in such a case is limited to examination whether the ground asserted in the petition, which may be one of the circumstances specified in Art. 1206 § 1 of the PCPC, exists. In addition, in the proceedings, a state court shall ex officio take into account the prerequisites set forth in Art. 1206 § 2 of the PCPC, irrespective of whether they were indicated in the petition or not.

3. The public policy clause covers both the procedural and the substantive fundamental principles of the legal order. Procedural public policy may be a ground for assessing an arbitration award in two aspects. First, the procedure which led to rendering of the arbitration award is assessed for its compliance with the fundamental principles of the legal order, second, the effects of the arbitration award are assessed from the perspective of their consistency with the procedural public policy, i.e. whether they are reconcilable with the system of procedural law. On the other hand, a violation by an arbitral tribunal of the substantive law applicable to the resolution of the legal relationship from which the dispute referred to arbitration arose, legitimates setting aside of the award only if it is connected with a violation of the fundamental principles of the legal order.

4. According to Art. 233 § 1 of the PCPC “The court shall assess the reliability and validity of evidence at its discretion, following extensive deliberations of the available material”. The boundaries of free assessment of evidence are determined by three factors: logical, statutory and ideological. The logical factor means that a court (an arbitral tribunal as well) is obliged to draw logically correct conclusions from the evidentiary material gathered in the case.

5. A reasoning of an arbitration award does not need to meet the same requirements as a reasoning of a state court ruling…, and an arbitral tribunal is not obliged to indicate in the reasoning of an arbitration award a precise interpretation of the relevant substantive provisions, in this case provisions regarding a contract for performance of a specific work, withdrawal from a contract, a contractual penalty.

1. The grounds of a petition to set aside an arbitration award have been divided in Art. 1206 of the PCPC into two categories, to which the prerequisites set out in § 1 and § 2 of this provision correspond. In case of the grounds indicated in § 1, the state court shall take them into account only upon request of a party, so it is bound by the grounds relied upon by the petitioner. The grounds indicated in § 2 shall be taken into account ex officio.

2. The public policy clause…, like any general clause is not precisely defined and does not include an exhaustive list of principles. Therefore in each case it is necessary to consider whether the circumstances make it possible to draw the conclusion that a violation was in breach of principles that are the fundamental principles of the legal order. Pursuant to the public policy clause expressed in Art. 1206 § 2 of the PCPC, an arbitration award shall be set aside when effects determined by its content are irreconcilable with the particular norm which is one of the fundamental principles of that order, which leaves a great degree of discretion to the state court ruling in a given case.

3. [A]n arbitration award shall correspond to the wording of the statement of claim. Depending on the content of the claim, an arbitration award may establish, rule on, or shape a right or a legal relationship.

4. [A]lthough Art. 1188 § 1 of the PCPC does not indicate obligatory elements of a statement of claim in arbitration, including the exact wording of the claim…, nonetheless the necessity to specify the claim, as the element determining the subject matter of arbitration, may be derived indirectly from Art. 1202 first sentence of the PCPC; it may also be derived from the procedural rules agreed upon by the parties or defined in the rules of arbitration. Irrespective of the above, this does not mean, however, that going beyond the limits of a claim by an arbitral tribunal evades the state court review.

5. [T]he audi alterem partem principle is the fundamental principle of the legal order. The audi alterem partem principle means the parties’ right to conduct a dispute in a way designated by them and shifts to them the burden of gathering factual and evidentiary material which is necessary to resolve a case.

1. It clearly follows from Art. 1206 of the PCPC that the list of the grounds for a petition to set aside an arbitration award contained therein is of an exhaustive character. Cognition of a state court in such a case is limited to examination whether the ground asserted in the petition, which may be one of the circumstances specified in Art. 1206 § 1 of the PCPC, exists. In addition, in the proceedings, a state court shall take into account ex officio the prerequisites set forth in Art. 1206 § 2 of the PCPC, irrespective of whether they were indicated in the petition or not.

2. A reasoning of an arbitration award does not need to meet the same requirements as a reasoning of a state court ruling, and an arbitral tribunal is not obliged to indicate in the reasoning of an arbitration award a precise interpretation of the relevant substantive provisions… .

3. The public policy clause in not intended for a review of an arbitration award on the merits. By application of this clause, the point is not to determine whether the award is consistent with all relevant mandatorily applicable legal regulations, but only to determine whether the award effected a result contrary to the fundamental principles of the domestic legal order.

4. As far as the assessment of the contested award in terms of infringement of governing norms in particular fields of substantive and procedural law is concerned, the following principles in this scope, indicated in the case-law, shall be taken into account: the right to court, understood as the right to have the case heard by an independent court within fairly conducted proceedings…, the obligation to redress damage by the party to a contract who did not perform or performed an obligation improperly, if there is a normal causal link between the conduct of the party and the damage…, and an obligation to redress a damage caused by an unlawful act…, the principle that compensation (both arising out of an unlawful act or under a contract) is only due if the aggrieved party sustained a damage…, the principle of business freedom and freedom of contract, and the principle of the autonomy of the will of the parties and equality of the parties…, the principle of stability of contracts and contractual fairness, and the principle of compensatory character of liability expressed in the prohibition of imposing sanctions in the form of pecuniary benefits that enrich one of the parties…, the principle of the binding force of final court rulings… and the prohibition of existence of two rulings between the same parties which resolve the same issue differently…, obligation to specify in the contract the essentialia negotii thereof… .

5. [T]here is a great deal of autonomy in arbitration, entirely consistent with the intention of lawmakers, distinctly limiting the availability of state court review. The basic goal of arbitration is to expedite the procedure for resolving civil disputes, not to create an additional phase of pre-judicial procedure, or a judicial procedure similar to an explanatory procedure. Parties who decide to submit a dispute to arbitration must thus take into account such conditions, including also the limited external review of arbitration awards.

6. [W]hen considering a petition to set aside an arbitration award, a state court generally does not review the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on the merits, and in particular does not review whether the award is founded on the facts cited in the reasoning or whether such facts were correctly determined.

7. [T]he only necessary elements of the reasoning of an arbitration award are findings on which the arbitral tribunal relied and the circumstances which the arbitral tribunal deemed necessary to examine in the case.

1. The essence of arbitration consists of three principles: (i) the non-state character of arbitration, (ii) joint will of the parties as the source of jurisdiction to resolve the dispute and (iii) equating the legal force of an arbitration award with the legal force of a state court judgment.

2. A state court ruling on recognition or enforcement of an arbitration award results in ascribing to the award the same force that rulings of state courts have, which is clearly confirmed by Art. 1212 § 1 of the PCPC. Such an award, thanks to the state court ruling connected with it, must be treated in legal dealings the same as any other ruling of a state court, i.a. it has all the features indicated in Art. 365 § 1 of the PCPC.

3. The purpose of proceedings initiated by a petition to set aside an arbitration award is only to verify the petitioner’s pleadings presented in the petition as to existence of the grounds referred to in Art. 1206 § 1 of the PCPC, and to assess if any of the prerequisites referred to in Art. 1206 § 2 of the PCPC exist.

4. [T]he validity and efficiency of an arbitration agreement shall be determined by the law in force at the time when the arbitration agreement was concluded… .

5. The agreement [arbitration agreement – insertion added] does not identify individual parties to the dispute, but the legal relationship or the object of a dispute, therefore certain claims (receivables), as a result of the arbitration agreement, have such a feature that disputes concerning them shall be resolved by an arbitral tribunal.

6. If a given legal relationship has been submitted to arbitration, the arbitral tribunal retains its jurisdiction to resolve the case, however, as a result of the assignment, the assignor, as a matter of principle, loses the ability to dispose of the claim in the substantive-law sense, in fact loses its ability to settle.

7. The public policy clause covers both the procedural and the substantive fundamental principles of the legal order. Procedural public policy may be a ground for assessing an arbitration award in two aspects. First, the procedure which led to rendering of the arbitration award is assessed for its compliance with the fundamental principles of the legal order, second, the effects of the arbitration award are assessed from the perspective of their consistency with the procedural public policy, i.e. whether they are reconcilable with the system of procedural law. On the other hand, a violation by an arbitral tribunal of the substantive law applicable to the resolution of the legal relationship from which the dispute referred to arbitration arose, legitimates setting aside of the award, only if it is connected with a violation of the fundamental principles of the legal order. At the same time, in the event of non-compliance of an award with the fundamental principles of the legal order, the question is not whether the award is compliant with all absolutely binding provisions of law, but whether the award has had an effect which is irreconcilable with the fundamental principles of the state legal order… .

8. The principle of interpretation of declarations of will is covered by the public policy clause. … The principle of freedom of contracts is also one of the fundamental principles of the substantive legal public policy.

1. Generally, a state court cannot examine whether an award challenged in a petition to set aside was based on properly established facts and how and whether an arbitral tribunal correctly interpreted the norms of substantive law it applied (…).

2. By examination of the grounds and prerequisites set out in Art. 1206 § 1 point 4 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code, what is important is the presence of a failure to meet the requirements in the scope of fundamental principles of arbitration proceedings resulting from a statute or specified by the parties. One of these principles is to base the award on established facts, which takes place after hearing of evidence. (…). Thus, only if the state court found that such hearing of evidence has not been conducted at all, or has been incomplete or obviously faulty, in breach of the principles of logical reasoning, of linking facts together in a cause-and-effect chain, selective admission of evidence in the case, examination of evidence of only one party in groundless omission of the evidence requested by the other party, etc., it would be possible to find that the requirements set out in Art. 1206 § 1 point 4 of the PCPC. (…).

3. [A]n obvious discrepancy between an arbitration award and the facts of the case may demonstrate a violation of the rule of law (…). This means that not every declaration that an award is inconsistent with the factual state may result in setting aside of this award. It is assumed that a conclusion that the rule of law has been violated is justified, if as a result of the arbitration award the fundamental principles of the legal order of the state are infringed (…).

[I]n accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States, the national legislature may give the competent authority, in the complaints and penalty procedures referred to in Articles 80 to 82 of Directive 2007/64, as amended by Directive 2009/111, the power to take into account the existence and contents of an arbitration ruling settling a dispute between a user and provider of payment services concerned by those procedures, provided that the probative value given to that ruling in those procedures is not liable to undermine the purpose or specific objectives of the procedures, the rights of defence of the persons concerned or the independent exercise of the powers and competencies conferred on that authority, which is a matter for the referring court to ascertain.

1. The essence of the petition to set aside an arbitration award is to create a review mechanism respecting, on the one hand, the separateness and autonomy of arbitration, and on the other hand, preventing non-state court rulings violating the rule of law from functioning in the legal circulation. Proceedings initiated by a petition to set aside an arbitration award do not result in reconsideration of the merits of the dispute between the parties, but are intended only at verification of the petitioner’s allegations as to the existence of the grounds raised in the petition, as provided for in Art. 1206 § 1 of the PCPC. The aim of the petition is to prevent an arbitration award that is non-compliant the elementary formal requirements of dispute resolution from remaining in the legal circulation… .

2. [The legal doctrine – insertion added] raises that the possibility of conducting arbitration proceedings [before the Internet Domains Arbitration Court at the Polish Chamber of Information Technology and Telecommunications – insertion added] is not excluded by the fact that after filing of the lawsuit, in order to avoid liability for infringements, the content of the website in the disputed domain has been changed in a way which does not allow to determine whether there is an infringement of a third party’s rights at the time.

3. Purposive, functional and comparative interpretation confirms that Art. 2 of the Arbitration Rules of the Internet Domains Arbitration Court at the Polish Chamber of Information Technology and Telecommunications should be interpreted in such a way that the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court includes examining of legal effects connected with the fact of registration, as well as the effects of registration occurring after the conclusion of the domain maintenance contract, with the proviso that the way in which the domain is used, not the mere fact of registration, usually allows for the assessment whether there has been such an infringement… .

4. The public policy clause covers both the procedural and substantive fundamental principles of the legal order. Procedural public policy may be a ground for assessing an arbitration award in two aspects. First, the procedure which led to rendering of an arbitration award is assessed for its compliance with the fundamental principles of the legal order, second, the effects of the arbitration award are assessed from the perspective of their consistency with the procedural public policy, i.e. whether they are reconcilable with the system of procedural law.

5. [A]rbitration awards after their recognition or enforcement enjoy also the substantive legal finality within the meaning of Art. 365 and 366 of the PCPC… .

6. Submission of a dispute existing between the parties to arbitration does not justify the conclusion that the parties have resigned from the right to reliable and insightful procedure ensuring the possibility of satisfaction of the legal interest of the parties that deserves to be protected.

1. The essence of arbitration is the autonomy and freedom of action of the parties and an arbitration tribunal is not bound by the provisions of the Polish Civil Procedure Code on proceedings before a state court (Art. 1184 § 2 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code). It is only bound by the mandatory provisions of the Polish Civil Procedure Code which regulate the arbitration procedure (…).

2. The scope of the final resolution by an arbitration tribunal of a submitted claim shall result from the conclusion of the arbitration award and cannot be derived from the statement of reasons (…).

3. [T]he basis in Art. 1206 § 2 point 2 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code is justified, if the effect of an arbitration award is contrary to the fundamental principles of the legal order of the state. These shall be understood not only as constitutional norms of fundamental importance, but also as the ground rules governing particular areas of substantive and procedural law.

4. A court, in proceedings to set aside an arbitration award, cannot resolve a dispute between the parties of arbitration proceedings as to the merits. Consequently, the court cannot examine, whether the arbitration award is not contrary to substantive law and whether this award is based on the facts given in its statement of reasons and whether these facts have been properly established.

5. The principle of the binding force of final court rulings (Art. 365 § 1 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code) as an element of the values protected constitutionally and in the international order is a part of the fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland. This rule also applies to arbitration awards after their recognition or enforcement by a state court. Such an award, thanks to the state court judgment related to it, has the same legal effect as a court judgment (Art. 1212 § 1 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code) (…).

6. A state court shall not allow two rulings between the same parties whose enforcement is guaranteed by the state, but which would resolve the same issue differently, to be present in the legal system, since this would undermine the authority of the justice system and the confidence in the courts, colliding with the principle of the stability of final rulings and the principle of legal certainty (…).

1. It was no accident that the lawmaker has used the word “reasons” in Art. 1197 § 2 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code, emphasizing that an arbitration award does not have to fully comply with the requirements of a justification of a state court ruling. As it has already been explained in the case law, if it is possible to infer from an arbitration award what prerequisites guided the arbitration court when it ruled on the demands of the parties, it can be deemed that these requirements have been fulfilled (…).

2. [J]urisdiction of an arbitral tribunal derived from an arbitration agreement does not have the character of a specific pre-jurisdiction – an arbitral resolves a case independently, instead of a state court, therefore it is the arbitral tribunal that is obliged to determine the factual basis and to legally assess the dispute. Control exercised over arbitration by a state court is not tantamount to resolution of a case ex novo, either on the factual or on the legal neveau (…).

3. [A] state court considering a petition to set aside an arbitration award does not interpret the agreement made by a parties to the dispute, and therefore it does not apply the aforementioned provision independently, but it only (…) examines the circumstances indicated in Art. 1206 § 1 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code, if the petitioner relies on them, and ex officio examines the circumstances specified in Art. 1206 § 2 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code.

1. [V]iolation of the fundamental principles of the Polish legal system may occur in the realm of both substantive and procedural law, which leads to a distinction between the substantive legal system and the procedural legal system. The fundamental principles of the Polish legal system should be understood to mean constitutional principles as well as the prime principles applicable in other fields of substantive and procedural law; the latter undoubtedly include the principle of the equality of the parties… .

2. A failure to admit and consider evidence offered by a party does not constitute deprivation of that party of a defense, if the arbitral tribunal duly justifies that procedural decision in accordance with the accepted rules… .

3. The essence of a petition to set aside an arbitration award is to provide a review mechanism respecting, on one hand, the separateness and autonomy of arbitration, and on the other hand, preventing the functioning in legal circulation of rulings by non-state courts violating the rule of law. Proceedings to set aside an arbitration award do not lead to reconsideration of the merits of the dispute between the parties, but are intended only to verify the petitioner’s allegations of the existence of the grounds raised in the petition provided for in Art. 1206 § 1 of the PCPC and assess whether any of the grounds provided for in Art. 1206 § 2 of the PCPC exist, whether or not asserted by the petitioner… .

4. [A]n arbitration agreement, arbitration rules of a permanent court of arbitration or otherwise adopted rules of procedure cannot violate Art. 1197 [of the PCPC – insertion added]. An arbitration award may contain elements not indicated in the provision – first and foremost, a ruling on the costs of the proceedings.

5. The written form of an [arbitration – insertion added] award is obligatory. An arbitration award shall, as a matter of principle, be signed by all the arbitrators, including arbitrators voting against the majority position. However, in the event of granting an award in the composition of at least 3 arbitrators, signatures of the majority of the arbitrators with indication why there are no signatures of the remaining arbitrators, are sufficient. It is accepted in the doctrine that an award acquires legal force when it is signed.

6. Article 1197 § 2 [of the PCPC – insertion added] stipulates that an arbitration award shall state the reasons for the ruling. Indication of the reasons for a ruling, on which an arbitral tribunal has based the award, does not have to comply with the requirements for the proceedings before a state court. In particular, an arbitral tribunal is not obliged to indicate the legal basis of its ruling. However, it shall result out of the reasoning on what facts an arbitral tribunal has based its ruling and which circumstances have been found by the arbitral tribunal to be significant to resolve a dispute.

7. Article 1197 [of the PCPC – insertion added] does not require an arbitration award to contain a ruling regarding the demands of the parties. This, however, is obvious.

1. The Court of Appeal shall rule on the enforcement of an arbitration award using provisions on appeal (Art. 1213¹ of the Polish Civil Procedure Code) and an order of the court of the second instance on enforcement of an arbitral award issued abroad shall be subject to a cassation appeal (Art. 1215 § 3 of the PCPC).

2. An application for declaration of enforceability in the form of granting of an enforcement clause to an arbitration award may be filed by a legal successor of a beneficiary of the arbitration award, if the beneficiary for the first time launches the procedure of incorporation of such an award to the domestic legal order (…). Jurisdiction of the court ruling in such a case is extended to include examination of the prerequisites from Art. 1214 § 3 and 1215 § 2 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code and legal succession (Art. 788 of the PCPC).

3. Article 788 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code applies to both court and out-of-court executive titles, including an arbitration awards which, after being declared enforceable by a court, have the same legal validity as a state court judgment (Art. 1212 § 1 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code).

4. [A]rbitration awards can be declared enforceable only one time.

5. Arbitration award is not an executive title (Art. 777 § 1 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code (…)). When a court declares it enforceable, such an award has the same legal validity as a court judgment (Art. 1212 § 1 of the PCPC) and becomes a writ of enforcement (Art. 1214 § 2 of the PCPC). An arbitration award which has been declared enforceable shall have such binding power as court judgments in force (Art. 365 of the PCPC) and shall have the force of res iudicata (Art. 366 of the PCPC). Such a writ of enforcement may be granted an enforcement clause as a result of a transfer of rights (Art. 788 of the PCPC) provided that the applicant is a legal successor of the person who obtained the writ of enforcement and the applicant proves legal succession with an official document or with a private document with an officially certified signature.

6. Neither legitimacy of a claim nor an obligation of a debtor resulting from an execution title to provide is not examined in the proceedings concerning enforcement of a foreign arbitration award (…).

1. According to Art. 1212 § 1 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code an arbitral award or a settlement made before an arbitral tribunal shall have legal effect equal to a court judgment or a settlement made before a court, upon recognition or enforcement thereof by the court. Confirmation of the enforceability of an arbitral award or settlement made before an arbitral tribunal which is capable of enforcement by way of execution, is made by the proceedings regarding obtaining an enforcement clause for it (Art. 1214 § 2 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code).

2. In the course of the proceedings for recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, the appellate court does not examine the merits of the claim established by the award, but limits itself solely to finding whether there are no negative prerequisites for recognition or enforcement of an award in the case. Art. 1214 § 3 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code enumerates 3 negative prerequisites justifying refusal to recognize or enforce an arbitration award.

1. By entering into an arbitration agreement, the parties revoke the competence of state courts to adjudicate the dispute, entrusting it to a body acting as per the will of the parties. Consequently, the state court control over an arbitration award, as much as it is necessary and statutorily guaranteed, is not instance control and by its nature must be incomplete, limited to the most far-reaching shortcomings and failures of arbitration, which are relevant not only from the point of view of the parties, but also of the general interest.

2. Given the vital role of the principle of the court being bound by the claim (…), it is deemed that the case in which an arbitral tribunal rules ultra petita ad aliu should not revoke the control of the state court. This assumption should be considered legitimate also in the light of the Polish Civil Procedure Code, with the proviso that the character of arbitration may justify an approach to the assessment of the limits of the claim more flexible than in the case of state courts.

3. [A]lthough, Art. 1188 § 1 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code does not indicate obligatory elements of a statement of claim in arbitration proceedings, including the exact wording of the claim (cf. Art. 187 § 1 point 1 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code), nonetheless the necessity to concretise the claim as an element determining the subject matter of arbitration proceedings may be derived indirectly from Art. 1202 first sentence of the Polish Civil Procedure Code; it may also be derived from the rules of procedure agreed upon by the parties or defined in the rules of arbitration.

4. Going beyond the limits of the statement of claim collided not only with the principle of availability which by virtue of its functions and the importance of the freedom of will for the institution of arbitration must be included into the principles of arbitration proceedings (…), but also with the principle of equality of the parties.

5. [S]ince the Arbitration Court ruled on a different claim than the claim advanced, the applicant was deprived of the ability to defend its rights.    

1. [B]y entering into an arbitration agreement, the parties consciously waived submission to the strictures in place for the proceedings before a state court, including some procedural guarantees in such proceedings. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to state that by concluding an arbitration agreement, the parties limit their constitutional right to court. When deciding to submit a dispute for resolution by an arbitral tribunal, the parties must be aware of both positive and negative effects of including particular statements in an arbitration agreement.

2. Unlike a state court, an arbitral tribunal considering cases does not need to strictly apply the provisions of substantive law, but may also base its ruling on principles of equity or rule on the basis of general principles of law. Consequently, review by the state court of awards made by arbitral tribunals is limited to the instances strictly defined by the law … .

3. [E]xamination of a case with respect to the grounds for setting aside an arbitration award under Art. 1206 § 2 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code may not proceed beyond aggravated violations of law, and the parties cannot challenge an arbitration award when such an award was delivered after properly conducted proceedings, but does not satisfy their expectations. A petition is possible only when it has been demonstrated that an arbitration award violates the fundamental principles of the Polish legal order … .

4. [P]ursuant to Art. 1197 § 2 of the PCPC, an arbitration award shall contain the reasons for the award, but this does not mean, however, that the reasoning shall be constructed strictly according to the rules indicated in Art. 328 § 2 of the PCPC … . This follows from the character of the proceedings before an arbitral tribunal, which are not as formalized as the proceedings in civil procedure. Without any doubt, however, the grounds of an arbitration award should be clear and reflect a reasoning analyzable in terms of the grounds to dismiss the petition … .

1. The consequence of submitting a dispute to arbitration is the limitation of the influence of common courts on how the dispute is resolved. When considering a petition to set aside an arbitration award, state courts do not examine arbitration awards on the merits. They review them only to a limited extent – only as regards the conditions provided for in Art. 1206 of the PCPC.

2. Only the absolutely binding legal standards (ius cogens) – and only those that are deemed to be of fundamental importance – may justify resorting to the public policy clause. These may be standards of a systematic, substantive or procedural nature – however, their role in the national legal system has to be significant. Application of the public policy clause is not intended to correct any and all shortcomings of an arbitration award, but rather to protect the integrity of the public order. Therefore, the assessment whether there are grounds for applying the public policy clause need to be formulated ad casum in a restrictive manner… .

3. In particular, it is not the task of the state court to inspect whether an arbitration award has been founded on the facts relied upon in the reasons for the arbitration award and whether these facts have been properly determined… .

4. The public policy clause, according to Art. 1206 § 2 of the PCPC, has the character of a general clause. Therefore, its concretization is the task of courts… . Because of the indefiniteness of the public policy clause, judges enjoy considerable discretion. Moreover, taking into account that an arbitration award is an expression of specific will of the persons competent to resolve a dispute, the clause is to be a kind of “safety valve” protecting the legal system against the unacceptable consequences of functioning, in the legal circulation, of an arbitration award delivered in violation of the fundamental principles of the legal order.

5. Only an allegation (or threat) of violation of the public policy clause may justify review of an arbitration award on merits.

6. The fundamental… principles [of the legal system of the Republic of Poland – insertion added] shall be understood to mean constitutional principles as well as the principles of other fields of law including civil law, family law, labour law and procedural law… .

7. The following principles are accepted by the doctrine and the case-law as the fundamental principles of the legal order: with regard to the procedural law, among other things: the principle of equal treatment of the parties; and with regard to the substantive law, among other things: the principle of the restitutive nature of liability for damages, the principle of the autonomy of the will of the parties and the principle of equity of the entities, the pacta sunt servanda principle, the principle of equal treatment of creditors in arrangement proceedings, the principle of economic freedom. Referring to the procedural legal order, it should be emphasized that two issues are assessed: firstly – the legal compliance of the arbitration resulting in the delivery of an arbitration award, and secondly – the effects of the arbitration award after its recognition and enforcement from the point of view of consistency with the system of procedural law, including the effects of the award on the legal position of third parties. Nevertheless, in terms of substantive legal order, review of an arbitration award should consist in comparison of the ruling contained in the arbitration award with a hypothetical ruling which should be delivered account taken of the fundamental principles of the legal order. It is then only by confronting it with the arbitrators' award that it is possible to assess whether or not there has been a breach of public policy. Any finding of contradiction is not sufficient, but only such that involves a violation of the fundamental values (principles) which are expressed or protected by specific legal standards.

8. A state court ruling on recognition (enforcement) of another award cannot overlook the fact that another state court has already delivered a ruling in the same case. Therefore, it should be found that it follows from Art. 365 § 1 of the PCPC that by the state court ruling on recognition of the second arbitration award which is bound by the previous state court ruling, should not allow for the existence of two rulings in the legal circulation which, in the same case and between the same parties, would address the same issue differently, as this would undermine the authority of the justice system and the confidence in the courts, i.e. it would be contrary to the fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland.

1. Relying on objective illegality of actions of the other party to an agreement and possible concurrent grounds of liability does not override the competence of an arbitral tribunal.

2. [A]n arbitration award may be assessed in the context of procedural public order. Subject to assessment is the compliance with the fundamental procedural principles of legal order of procedure that have led to the delivery of the arbitration award (…).

3. An allegation of infringement of Art. 1183 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code may be justified, if an arbitral tribunal conducts proceedings in omission of evidence offered by a party, but only if this evidence was necessary to resolve the case (…).

4. The control of elements comprising an arbitration award cannot be of the same scope as substantive control (of validity) of such an award.

5. When hearing a case, an arbitral tribunal may be guided by legal intuition, and it does not need to – unlike a state court – strictly apply the provisions of substantive law, but may base its ruling also on the principles of equity or good faith. According to the public policy clause expressed in Art. 1206 § 2 point 2 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code, an arbitration award shall be set aside when effects determined by the award are incompatible with a specific norm which is one of the fundamental principles of this public policy (…).

6. The arbitration award that protects one of the partners encumbered with the contractual risk of failure of the business venture does not infringe upon trading certainty and the principle of trading security, in the situation when the investor (the Fund) could limit its own economic risk resulting from engagement of funds by correct, consistent with the agreement, and, above all, loyal conduct.

7. Application of the public policy clause is not aimed at verification whether the assessed arbitration award id compliant with all applicable absolutely binding provisions of law, but whether effects of such an award are contrary to the fundamental principles of national legal order.

1. The mere potential option of setting aside of a judgment dismissing a petition to set aside an arbitration award is not a ground for ex officio suspending of the proceedings initiated by a request for enforcement of the arbitration award. This could only happen at the joint request of the parties (Art. 178 of the PCPC)… .

2. A party relying on… a document as evidence in a case, should… take into account that such evidence may be used by the arbitral tribunal in order to determine the factual state or to interpret the declarations of will of the parties.

3. When it decided to rely in the arbitration proceedings on the agreement of 29 October 2014, the party relying on the agreement had to reckon with the fact that this agreement could be used by the arbitral tribunal also to its disadvantage.

4. The said agreement… The contractual provision contained therein that “the agreement may be disclosed to the Court of Arbitration in the necessary scope, but the agreement shall not be used as evidence to the advantage of any party or as a basis for interpretation of any contractual provision of the contract”… did not establish a fundamental principle of procedure that would be binding for the arbitral tribunal. The prohibition to use this document as evidence was binding only for the parties to the contract. Evidentiary agreements are not known in the Polish civil procedure. It is difficult to accept that the parties could, by means of an agreement, exclude procedural provisions relating to evidence prohibition, and with a binding effect for the court at that, with the exceptions resulting from legal regulations. Relying by a party on the agreement… as evidence in the case could be alternatively assessed as contractual disloyalty of the parties… .

5. Pursuant to Art. 1217 of the PCPC, in proceedings for enforcement of an arbitration award issued in the Republic of Poland, the court shall not examine the circumstances referred to in Art. 1214 § 3 of the PCPC (identical to those set out in Art. 1206 § 2 of the PCPC), if a petition to set aside the arbitration award was denied with legal finality. The provision of Article 1217 of the PCPC provides for a binding effect of a final judgment dismissing a petition to set aside an arbitration award other than in relation to a legal relationship (resulting from Article 365 of the PCPC). It follows from Art. 1217 of the PCPC that the state court is bound by the determination regarding admissibility of the arbitration award, and that the arbitration award is not contrary to the public policy clause, therefore the state court does not examine these issues after the petition to set aside the arbitration award was denied with legal finality.

6. [A]rt. 1210 of the PCPC. According thereto, at a closed session, a court may stay the enforcement of an arbitration award, but may condition the stay on submission of a security. It cannot be overlooked that this provision forms a part of the regulation of the proceedings initiated by a petition to set aside an arbitration award (title VII in part five in book four of the Polish Civil Procedure Code – Art. 1205-1211 of the PCPC), and its object is the stay of enforcement of an arbitration award. It does not constitute a ground for staying other rulings.

7. [I]n the present legal state, the only basis for lodging a complaint regarding the appellate court order on enforcement of an arbitration award issued in the Republic of Poland is Art. 1214 § 4 of the PCPC.

1. The phrase “fundamental principles of the legal order” used in Art. 1206 §2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code refers to such a violation of provisions of substantive law that will result in violation of the principles of the rule of law, and the award infringes the overriding legal principles in force in the Republic of Poland and conflicts with the legal order, that is, it violates principles of the political and socioeconomic system.

2. The evaluation conducted in the specific case as to whether the ruling violates fundamental principles of the legal order must be made cautiously, and the wording used in the code should be interpreted narrowly.

3. When deciding to include an arbitration clause in a contract, the parties to a civil relationship consciously waive the formal protection provided to the participants in a judicial trial by various provisions of the Civil Procedure Code…. Consequently, they also agree to procedural conditions that are subject to significant autonomy in the course of the arbitration proceeding, leading to minimal external oversight of awards by the arbitral tribunal….

4. Procedural public policy may also be grounds for review of an arbitration award, in two aspects: the evaluation of the consistency of the procedure leading to issuance of the ruling by the tribunal with the fundamental procedural principles of the legal order, and the effects of such ruling from the point of view of their compliance with procedural public policy, that is, whether they can be reconciled with the system of procedural law.

5. The notion of the “grounds” [for an award] within the meaning of Art. 1197 §2 of the Civil Procedure Code does not literally mean “justification” [of a judgment] within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code, and this provision deliberately uses the word “grounds” and not “justification.” However, the grounds must contain the elements of reasoning of the arbitral tribunal which demonstrate the correctness (soundness) of the ruling in light of the entirety of the material gathered in the case.

6. Conduct of a fair proceeding is the task of both the state court and the arbitral tribunal. That the arbitral tribunal is not bound by regulations of procedure before a state court and under the Civil Procedure Code itself establishes the rules and method of proceeding before it, as agreed by the parties and as it deems proper, does not mean arbitrariness with respect to the principles of judicial civil procedure of an adversarial nature.

1. A state court takes into account the grounds for setting aside an arbitration award set out in Art. 1206 § 1 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code (…) only upon a request of a party. Therefore, a state court is, in this regard, bound by the grounds cited in the petition.

2. [I]n proceedings initiated by a petition to set aside an arbitration award, a state court does not examine the accuracy of the assessment of evidence made by the arbitral tribunal, the correctness of factual findings, the accuracy of interpretation and application of the substantive law. The legitimacy of a specific method of resolving the disputed legal relationship by an arbitral tribunal is neither the subject to assessment by a state court. The essence of a petition to set aside an arbitration award is to provide a review mechanism respecting, on the one hand, the separateness and autonomy of arbitration, and, on the other hand, preventing the functioning in the legal system of rulings rendered by non-state courts in breach of the rule of law. Proceedings initiated by a petition to set aside an arbitration award do not, therefore, result in reconsideration of the merits of the dispute between the parties, but is only to verify the petitioner’s allegations concerning the existence of the grounds raised in the petition and set out in Art. 1206 § 1 of the PCPC, and provide an assessment as to whether any of the grounds provided for in Art. 1206 § 2 of the PCPC exist (…).

3. [T]he notion of the public policy clause within the meaning of Art. 1206 § 2 (2) of the PCPC is commonly identified with the fundamental constitutional principles and the prime principles of particular fields of law, including civil, family and procedural law. An arbitration award may be set aside on the basis of the public policy clause, if such an award is contrary to a specific, mandatory legal norm included in the aforementioned principles. In the case law of the Polish Supreme Court (…) it has been indicated, for example, that the fundamental principles of the Polish legal order include, among others, the principle of freedom of will in civil law, the pacta sund servanda principle and the principles setting limits of the freedom to form contracts and consequently the limits of the pacta sund servanda principle, as wells as the principle of freedom of business activity, the principle of contractual justice and the principle of compensatory nature of liability for damages (…).

4. [P]ursuant to Art. 1197 § 2 of the PCPC, an arbitration award shall contain the reasons for the award. However (…) it should be assumed that the requirement set out in Art. 1197 § 2 of the PCPC is not equivalent to the obligation of an arbitral tribunal to draw up a reasoning containing all elements provided for in Art. 328 § 2 of the PCPC. As the Polish Supreme Court indicates, to recognize that the requirements set out in Art. 1197 § 2 of the PCPC have been fulfilled, it is sufficient to be able infer from the reasons drawn up by the arbitral tribunal what premises were applied by the arbitral tribunal when the tribunal ruled on the parties’ demands (…)

5. No award with respect to capitalised interest may also justify (…) the allegation that the arbitration award violated Art. 481 § 1 of the Polish Civil Code. However, taking into account particularly the dispositive nature of this legal norm, it cannot be classified as one of the prime principles of civil law. Therefore, such a violation cannot be deemed a ground for setting aside an arbitration award on the basis of Art. 1206 § 2 (2) of the PCPC. 

1. A petition to set aside an arbitration award is not… an ordinary legal remedy (for example, an appeal) whereupon a court may reassess the merits of the case and the accuracy of the resolution of a dispute by the arbitral tribunal on the merits. Therefore the lawmaker… specified strictly defined grounds for a petition only. However, the lawmaker also specified … that only two circumstances may be taken into account ex officio, namely, that the dispute could not be resolved by the arbitral tribunal or that the arbitration award is contrary to the fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland.

2. Experiences connected with the application of the public policy clause in international civil proceedings and private international law may be used by interpretation of the public policy clause… .

3. [I]f an arbitration award is contrary to the public policy of the Republic of Poland, this does not mean that such an award could be contrary to any of the principles of the state legal order, but that it is contrary only to the fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland, i.e. constitutional standards, but also standards resulting from labour law, family law or procedural civil law… . Therefore, the concept of public policy is a concept narrower than the concept of the rule of law which entails the obligation to apply, in principle, all legal standards, including absolutely binding legal standards. The following principles have deemed by the doctrine to be the fundamental principles of legal order in terms of civil procedure: the principle of equal treatment of the parties to arbitration, or in terms of substantive law: the principle of freedom of the contract, the pacta sunt servanda principle.

4. It needs to be borne in mind that an arbitral tribunal enjoys much greater freedom in terms of conducting proceedings, including evidence proceedings, than a state court does. According to Art. 328 § 2 of the PCPC, reasoning of a state court’s judgment shall provide the factual basis for the ruling… However, pursuant to Art. 1197 § 2 of the PCPC, an arbitration award must only contain the reasons for the award… . Indication of the reasons which the arbitral tribunal relied upon by delivery of an award does not have to comply with the requirements of state court proceedings. In particular, an arbitral tribunal is not obliged to indicate the factual basis for its award. However, it must result from the reasoning on what facts the arbitral tribunal relied upon and which circumstances it considered necessary to resolve the dispute.

5. [T]he character of arbitration proceedings makes it possible to apply the rules indicated in Art. 322 of the PCPC.

6. The limits of the discretion of an arbitral tribunal in conducting evidentiary proceedings are determined by the requirements of thorough examination of the circumstances essential to resolve the dispute and of equal treatment of the parties to arbitration. Depriving a party of the opportunity to defend its rights should be interpreted narrowly. Arbitral tribunal’s rejection of evidence offered by a party because it finds the evidence unnecessary does not constitute depriving the party of an opportunity of a defense.

7. An arbitral tribunal has, like any other court, the power to assess a contract in terms of whether specific rights and obligations arise out of the provisions of the contract for one or both parties. If the assessment made in this respect, taking into account the joint intention of the parties and the purpose of the contract, is based on evidence gathered in the case, including the hearing of the parties, an assessment unfavourable to one of the parties cannot be regarded as a violation of the fundamental public policy principle.

8. The fundamental principles of the legal order include, among other things, the principle of civil liability for the damage caused…, the principle of the restitutive nature of liability for damages… .

1. Art. 1206 of the PCPC stipulates grounds for a petition to set aside an arbitration award and this enumeration is of exhaustive character … . A state court hearing a petition is in principle bound by the grounds cited by the petitioner, however, the grounds for setting aside an award indicated in Art. 1206 § 2 of the PCPC shall be examined ex officio.

2. [A] petition [to set aside an arbitration award] is of quashing nature, as a state court can only set aside the arbitration award in full, in part or reject the petition, but the state court cannot rule on the merits of the case.

3. According to Art. 1207 of the PCPC, Art. 368 of the PCPC shall apply accordingly to a petition to set aside an arbitration award and the provisions governing an appeal shall apply accordingly to a petition to set aside an arbitration award, unless otherwise provided therein.

4. The assessment of whether an arbitration award violates the fundamental principles of the legal order should be thus conducted on a case-by-case basis, narrowly, and an affirmative conclusion may be reached only if the effects of the arbitration award would result in a material violation of the aforementioned principles. However, it should be emphasized that there is a great deal of autonomy of arbitration, essentially limiting the possibilities for review by the state court.

5. In the case law, the fundamental principles of the legal order include, among other things: the principle of civil liability for the injury caused …, the principle of the restitutive nature of liability for damages …, the pacta sunt servanda principle …, the principle of business freedom and freedom of contract, the principle of contractual fairness …, the principle of protection of property rights …, the principle of the autonomy of the will of the parties and the equality of entities … . The aforementioned enumeration is, naturally, only of an exemplary character, because the assessment regarding inconsistency of an arbitration award with the fundamental principles of legal order may be determined based on the analysis of a given case, however, with the proviso that it must be a discrepancy of obvious, general and fundamental character, i.e. a discrepancy which is incompatible with the principles of a democratic state of law, when an arbitration award infringes the governing legal principles in force in the Republic of Poland.

6. [P]ursuant to Art. 1197 § 2 of the PCPC, an arbitration award shall contain the reasons for the award, but this does not mean, however, that the reasoning shall be constructed strictly according to the rules indicated in Art. 328 of the PCPC, which stipulates necessary elements of the state court reasoning. This follows from the character of arbitration proceedings, which are not as formalized as civil law proceedings. However, without any doubt, the grounds of an arbitration award should be clear and reflect a reasoning analyzable in terms of the grounds to reject the petition, but in the properly formulated reasoning an arbitral tribunal is not obliged to refer to all the arguments and arguments presented by a party at any stage of the arbitration proceedings and in any form … . It is sufficient for the arbitral tribunal to consider all factual circumstances and arguments of a judicial nature, significant from the point of view of the award and the examined legal relationship.

7. The circumstance … that not all arguments and evidence were deemed well-founded and sufficiently significant for the outcome of the arbitral award does not mean that a party has been deprived of the possibility to defend its rights or that the principle of equality has been infringed.

8. [I]n arbitration proceedings, the tribunal may also disregard evidence motions of the parties, if the tribunal finds they are not necessary to examine the case or examination of the evidence encounters significant obstacles … .

1. The difference between ruling on the basis of the principles of equity and application of Art. 5 of the Polish Civil Code lies is the scope of the interference. Resolution of a dispute on the basis of the principles of equity allows an arbitral tribunal to substitute positive law with social norms and to assess all circumstances of the disputed relationship according to this criterion, whereas application of Art. 5 of the Polish Civil Code is limited to assessment of compliance of the exercise of a subjective right with social norms.

2. [T]he public policy clause makes it possible to eliminate systemically defective arbitration awards that grossly transgress against the foundations of the Polish legal order.

3. [A]ssessment whether the principle of pacta sunt servanda has been infringed as a result of a restriction arising out of a contractual subjective right, especially in the case when an arbitral tribunal rules on the basis of legal provisions (Art. 1194 § 1 of the PCPC) must include an examination of the grounds of applying Art. 5 of the Polish Civil Code, because only this way it may be assessed whether the foundations of the legal order have been violated or not.

1. [T]he principle of hearing a case by an independent, impartial and unbiased court applies to every judicial proceedings, also before arbitral tribunals, which are treated as courts of trust. … . Lack of impartiality renders an arbitration award contrary to the principles of public policy.

2. The public policy clause, like any general clause, is indeterminate, which leaves a court seized of a particular case a wide range of discretion, nonetheless, review on this basis of the elements comprising a ruling of an arbitral tribunal cannot take dimensions proper for a review of the merits (correctness) of the ruling. The prohibition of the review of the merits (correctness) of such ruling is connected with the essence of application of the public policy clause. When the clause is used, it is not the point that the awards which is subject to the assessment must be consistent with all relevant absolutely binding provisions of law. The point is whether the award has had an effect contrary to the fundamental principles of the national legal order.

3. [T]he phrase “fundamental principles of legal order” used in Art. 1206 § 2 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code refers to such a violation of provisions of substantive law that results in violation of the principles of the rule of law, and the award infringes the overriding legal principles in force in the Republic of Poland and conflicts with the legal order, that is, it violates the principles of the political and socioeconomic system.

4. Determination of whether an arbitration award violates fundamental principles of public order must be formulated narrowly … .

5. Procedural public policy may be grounds for assessing an arbitration award in two aspects. First, the procedure which led to issuance of the arbitration award is assessed for its compliance with the fundamental procedural principles of the legal order. Second, the effects of the arbitration award are assessed from the perspective of their consistency with the procedural public policy i.e. whether they are reconcilable with the system of procedural law, e.g. whether they violate the principles of res iudicata or the rights of third parties … .

6. [T]here is a great deal of autonomy in arbitration procedure, entirely consistent with the intention of the lawmaker, distinctly limiting the availability of review by the state court … . Parties who decide to submit a dispute to an arbitral tribunal must thus be aware of such conditions, including also of minimal external review of arbitration awards … .

1. A petition [to set aside an arbitration award] in the current shape, maintaining its distinct character with all its limitations, in particular concerning the grounds of the petition, is similar to an appeal. If a petition is well-founded, a state court may only revoke an arbitration award, which does not lead to expiration of the arbitration agreement (Art. 1211 of the PCPC) and should not be treated as consideration of the merits of the case submitted to arbitration. A ruling of a state court frustrates the effects of an arbitration award if any of the grounds indicated in Art. 1206 of the PCPC occurred, however, a ruling of a state court does not resolve, as a matter of principle, the legal dispute between the parties which was referred to arbitration with the exception of determining that an arbitration agreement does not exist, is invalid, ineffective or lost its legal power according to the applicable law.

2. Commencement of proceedings to remove an arbitrator before the conclusion of the proceedings before an arbitral tribunal results in the proceedings regulated in Art. 1176 of the PCPC being the proper procedure to consider the application and the assessment whether there were grounds to remove an arbitrator. However, in the situation of conclusion of proceedings before an arbitral tribunal, the only way to challenge the composition of the arbitral tribunal delivering the award in the case are proceedings initiated by a petition to set aside an arbitration award.

3. In evaluating whether an arbitration award in inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the legal order, the content of the award should be considered, and not the correctness of the procedure before the arbitral tribunal or the correctness of the composition thereof.

4. Because of the fact that the relationships between the arbitral tribunal and the claimant are of institutional and permanent character and the mere arbitration agreement concerns purely and simply one relevant arbitral tribunal, it should be deemed consequently that the arbitration agreement of such content is at least ineffective, i.e. it does not bring any legal effects. It is also reasonable to assume that the arbitration agreement is invalid because the dispute cannot be adjudicated by the indicated arbitral tribunal, i.e. the arbitration award has no relevant content.

1. The scope of review of an arbitration award is limited only to the prerequisites indicated in Art. 1206 of the Polish Civil Procedure Code and the defectiveness of such an award in terms of facts or law is not generally examined in the proceedings initiated by a petition to set aside an arbitration award. Limitation of the cognition of the state court in such proceedings has its source in the voluntary resignation from the constitutional right to court by the parties to the arbitration agreement… . … the state court is not bound by the grounds for setting aside of an arbitration award invoked in the petition, so ex officio it shall examine only … the prerequisites enumerated in Art. 1206 § 2 of the PCPC … .

2. [A]rt. 365 § 1 of the PCPC is one of the fundamental systemic principles of the Polish law and the violation of this provision shall be assessed as a violation of the fundamental procedural principles of the legal order … .

3. Submission to an arbitral tribunal of disputes under a contractual relationship means in other words that the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal includes any and all claims for performance of the contract, claims arising in the event of non-performance or improper performance of the contract, claims to restore undue consideration arising in the event of invalidity of the contract or rescission of the contract, as well as tort claims if they arise out of an event that also constitutes non-performance or improper performance of the contract … .

4. A violation of the provisions of substantive law by an arbitral tribunal only exceptionally may be a basis for setting aside of an arbitration award, namely, when the infringed norm is of ius cogens character and a special role in the domestic legal system is attributed to it, usually in the context of certain constitutional principles. The assessment whether there are grounds for applying the public policy clause shall, however, be formulated ad casum and thus in a restrictive manner … .

5. [T]he arbitration court’s erroneous interpretation or incorrect application of the provisions regarding the limitation periods or preclusion shall not be regarded as violation of fundamental principles of the legal order … .

6. [T]he requirements in terms of the reasons for the arbitration award feature, with reference to the reasoning of the state court’s judgment, some minimalism and to find them fulfilled it is sufficient if it is possible to deduce from them what grounds the arbitral tribunal has based on.

1. Accepting that an arbitration award does not have binding force or res judicata effect would totally undermine the purpose for the existence of arbitration.

2. Pursuant to Civil Procedure Code Art. 1212 §1, the state court is bound, under the rules set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 365, by a legally final and enforceable arbitration award, which also has res judicata effect in the respect indicated in Civil Procedure Code Art. 366.

3. Under Civil Procedure Code Art. 365, both the court and the parties are bound by a legally final and enforceable arbitration award issued in the case pending with their participation. This binding force means that such award is of a preclusive nature in another case between the same parties if the specific relationship exists between the award and the subsequently pending case consisting in the legally final prior ruling impacting the resolution of the pending case.

1. The FIDIC conditions are a set of procedures and conditions describing the course of construction projects. Among other things, they describe the rights and obligations of the participants in the construction process, including in clause 20 the procedure for disputes and arbitration. … Interpretation of the provisions included in the FIDIC conditions included in the contract in force between the parties is made in accordance with the principles of interpretation of declarations of will (contracts) set forth in Art. 56 and Art. 65 §§ 1 and 2 of the Civil Code.

2. Pursuant to FIDIC clause 20.4, “If a dispute (of any kind whatsoever) arises between the Parties in connection with, or arising out of, the Contract or the execution of the Works, … either Party may refer the dispute in writing to the DAB [dispute adjudication board]”. The use of the word “may” in this clause should be understood only to mean that pursuit of claims is a right and not an obligation of a party. But if the party does decide to pursue the claim, according to FIDIC clause 20 it must submit the claim to a dispute adjudication board.

3. Pursuant to FIDIC clause 20.8, “If a dispute arises between the Parties in connection with, or arising out of, the Contract or the execution of the Works and there is no DAB [dispute adjudication board] in place, whether by reason of the expiry of the DAB’s appointment or otherwise: Sub-Clause 20.4 [Obtaining Dispute Adjudication Board’s Decision] and Sub-Clause 20.5 [Amicable Settlement] shall not apply, and the dispute may be referred directly to arbitration under Sub-Clause 20.6 [Arbitration].” Under the circumstances of this case, the possibility of referring the dispute directly to arbitration arose “otherwise,” i.e. by the parties’ failure to agree on the composition of the dispute adjudication board and failure by either of them to apply to the appointing authority to appoint the DAB.

4. The fundamental principles of the legal order are fundamental constitutional principles and the leading principles governing specific fields of substantive and procedural law.

1. It is permissible to seek to set aside an arbitration award in part, if the challenged resolution can be separated from the remaining part of the award.

2. In a proceeding to set aside an arbitration award, the court cannot set aside the award in part if the petitioner applied to set aside the award in its entirety and there are grounds to grant the petition. This is because a demand to set aside an arbitration award in part is not a lesser included demand in a demand to set aside the award in its entirety; it is a different type of demand. Moreover, if the particular parts of the award interlock so that none of the parts can be separated from the other parts without materially deforming the entirety, it is impermissible to set aside the award in part.

3. Informing a party only in the justification of the award that (despite denying the claim in its entirety) one of the party’s demands was not considered because the fee for that claim was not paid, when that demand was the subject of examination during the evidentiary proceeding and was the subject of the response to the statement of claim and pleadings by both parties, while at the same time granting the demands of the opposing party in their entirety, which resolution was dependent on the resolution of the plaintiff’s demands, indicates that the arbitration award is contrary to the public policy clause, depriving the party of the ability to exercise the rights provided by regulations of substantive law and also indirectly depriving the party of a defence against the counterclaims of the opposing party. This method of proceeding before the arbitration court violates the party’s right to a fair and honest trial.

4. Resolving the respondent’s demands in their entirety before resolving the claimant’s complete demand, regardless of whether or not the party could apply for supplementation of the award, is also contrary to fundamental principles of the legal order, including violation of the principle of equal treatment of the parties. Moreover, the arbitration court would already be bound by the award issued by it in the part concerning the counterclaim, and thus it could not issue a ruling with different substantive legal consequences. Undoubtedly the principles of a fair trial require that the party be informed prior to issuance of an award of the possible taking of a procedural decision as to one of the party’s claims, regardless of whether the claimant’s claim is deemed to be an alternative claim (as it was worded, in the event that the main claim is not upheld) or as a separate procedural claim in an accumulation of claims.

5. The defence of the ineffectiveness of an arbitration clause may be asserted not only by the respondent, but also by the claimant. However, it is indicated in the legal literature that in such case, the claimant, as the party initiating the proceeding before the arbitration court, should make a thorough analysis of the factual and legal state of the case, including issues connected with the grounds for commencement of the proceeding before the arbitration court, and if it concludes that the clause is ineffective, it should file the case with the state court, which upon the objection of the respondent will resolve the issue of the effectiveness of the clause. As indicated in the literature, asserting the ineffectiveness of the clause only at this stage violates the principle of due diligence which a professional participant in commercial dealings is required to comply with.

6. An arbitration clause may cease to be in force in the instances set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1168 and 1195 §4 or in the bankruptcy law, or in the occurrence of certain substantive legal events (e.g. repudiation of the legal consequences of a declaration of will), including those indicated by the parties as the reasons for the clause ceasing to be in force. The mere change in the rules of the arbitration court does not result in loss of force of the clause, either under the regulations currently in force or in accordance with the regulations in force on the date of conclusion of the clause.

7. The mere fact that one of the parties to the arbitration participated in creation of the list of arbitrators by nominating candidates for arbitrators from among persons who are authorities in the given field does not mean that there is dependency between the arbitrator and the party or that the party has greater rights. Despite the indirect influence of the banks over a portion of some panels of arbitrators, the rules of the Court of Arbitration at [the Polish Bank Association] ensure the impartially of the arbitration court and do not violate the principle of the equality of the parties in the arbitration proceeding. Because there are numerous arbitrators [on the list], and the party does not know which of them will hear the case and does not select a specific person as presiding arbitrator, it cannot be found that the party had greater rights than its opponent.

8. A petition to set aside an arbitration award may concern issues of the procedure followed only if fundamental principles of procedure before the arbitration court, arising out of a statute or specified by the parties, were not complied with (Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(4)). In essence this has to do with failure to comply with fundamental principles of civil procedure, but it was not demonstrated that the arbitration court failed to comply with such principles.

1. The state court considering a case seeking to set aside an arbitration award cannot re-examine the merits of the dispute. … Treating the scope of review by the state court differently would undermine the autonomy of arbitration, which would place it in a kind of protectorate of the state court system, thus distorting not only the ideals on which the functioning of arbitration is based but also the intention of the Parliament, which in modifying the rules for its functioning limits the scope of intervention by the state court system to exceptional instances expressly stated in the law.

2. The state court is not entitled to review whether the arbitration court properly determined the facts and properly evaluated the evidence. This falls within the bounds of the resolution on the merits of the asserted claims.

1. The fact that two arbitrators, constituting a majority of the panel, had already signed drafts of the awards was certainly not valid grounds for the presiding arbitrator to refuse to continue deliberations over the awards. This was not equivalent to the act of voting, not to mention equivalent to deliberations on the resolution and the grounds for the resolution. Refusal to continue the deliberations in order to discuss the comments means that it cannot be said that the deliberations were completed and voting was held on the awards. … As pointed out in the legal literature, the list of examples of violations with respect to regulations on voting, removal of an arbitrator and the award which were set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 712 §1(3) (in force through 16 October 2005) were not expressly carried over to the wording of Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(4). There is no doubt, however, that a violation of these rules should generally be treated as a violation of fundamental rules of procedure.

2. Ignoring evidence offered by a party because the arbitration court found the evidence to be unnecessary will not qualify as depriving the party of the ability to present a defence. Examination by the state court of whether the arbitration court correctly found such evidence to be unnecessary would constitute impermissible encroachment into the merits of the case. If the arbitration court ignored a certain portion of the defence presented by the party, while including in the grounds for the award a substantive explanation of the reasons it found the defence to be irrelevant, then the party’s allegation with respect to ignoring its defence is in reality directed against the substantive defence of the dispute and as such is impermissible.

The manner of service specified in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1160 should be applied also to arbitration awards. … There is no reason that the written notice referred to in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1160 should not also be understood to include an arbitration award.

Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, in particular Articles 6(1), 7(1) and 8 of that directive, read in conjunction with Articles 38 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which does not allow a consumer protection association to intervene in support of a consumer in proceedings for enforcement, against the latter, of a final arbitration award.

1. Application by the arbitration court of the substantive law applicable in the case is subject to review by the common court only insofar as required by the evaluation of the arbitration award, made by the court on its initiative, under the public policy clause set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §2(2), in terms of the award’s possible inconsistency with fundamental principles of the Polish legal system.

2. Alongside the principles of freedom of contract and the enforceability of contracts, the fundamental principles of the Polish legal system also include principles setting the boundaries of the freedom of contract and, in consequence, the limits of application of the principle of enforceability of contracts. These are more specifically the principle of business freedom, the principle of contractual fairness, and the principle of the compensatory nature of liability in damages, interpreted in compliance with the constitutional requirement of proportionality (Constitution Art. 31(3)), opposing inclusion in contracts of monetary consideration as a sanction for violation of an obligation in an amount far removed from the dimension of the loss, so that it becomes primarily a quasi-penal measure and leads to enrichment of the other party.

3. The reduction of the agreed contractual penalty by the arbitration court did not display the features of an arbitrary limitation of the legal consequences of providing for the contractual penalty, but fell within the bounds of statutory authority.

4. Any irregularities in application of Civil Code Art. 484 §2 by the arbitration court not resulting in the inconsistency of the award issued by it with the fundamental principles of the legal system could not be relevant in proceedings to set aside the award.

The state court hearing a petition to set aside an arbitration award may consider whether in the specific case there were valid grounds justifying a departure [by the arbitration court] from the rule of being bound by a legally final judgment, and reference to the circumstances permitting reopening of proceedings before a state court should be helpful in this respect. … From the point of view of the grounds for reopening proceedings, there is nothing preventing new factual circumstances from being disclosed as a result of actions conducted by an expert in a different case, after the end of the proceeding that would be reopened. It is essential that they be circumstances that already existed during the course of the completed proceeding.

1. Under Art. 1197 §3 of the Civil Procedure Code, an arbitration award is a less formalized document than a state court judgment. In particular, it should be agreed that the identification of the parties to the proceeding before the arbitral tribunal does not have to be included in the caption of the award, but at any place in the award. It should be deemed sufficient to include the designation of the parties in the operative wording of the award using the phrase “awards against respondent X in favour of claimant Y the amount Z,” or to identify the parties in the justification for the award, which is an integral part of the award.

2. Art. 1214 §3 of the Civil Procedure Code has to do with a situation in which enforcement of the arbitration award would result in violation of [fundamental principles of the legal order]. This provision thus requires attention to the substantive content of the arbitration award, that is, to assess the adjudicated claim in terms of the permissibility of its realization in light of fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland. This does not refer however to formal irregularities committed by the arbitral tribunal.

1. Participation in a judicial proceeding by entities lacking judicial capacity would result in the invalidity of the proceeding, while issuance of an arbitration award with respect to such entities would be regarded as a violation of the fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland, because it would violate one of the fundamental procedural rules that only a party vested with judicial capacity can be a party to proceedings. Moreover, such an award would also violate the fundamental principle of civil law that only entities vested with legal capacity can be the subject of civil-law rights and obligations.

2. If a party raises the objection that the arbitration court lacks jurisdiction or the objection that a demand asserted by the opposing party exceeds the bounds of the arbitration clause (Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 § 2), and the arbitration court deems these objections unfounded, the arbitration court may issue an award, stating therein that it deemed the objections raised to be unfounded, or overrule the objections in a separate order. In the first instance, the correctness of the position of the arbitration court on the objection raised by the party may be reviewed in a petition to set aside the arbitration award. However, if the arbitration court issues an order overruling the objection, review of the correctness of this position by the state court may occur only under the procedure provided for in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 § 3, i.e. by the party who raised the objection applying to the state court for a ruling within two weeks after service of the order on the party. The party’s failure to initiate such procedure for review of the order issued by the arbitration court deprives the party of the possibility of effectively basing a petition to set aside the arbitration award on the same objections constituting grounds for a petition to set aside an arbitration award under Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 § 1 (1) and (3).

3. The arbitration court’s violation of regulations of law, even regulations that are mandatorily applicable, does not necessarily mean violation of fundamental principles of the legal order, even if the arbitration court resolves the dispute according to the law governing the given relationship, when under Civil Procedure Code Art. 1194 § 1 the parties did not authorize it to decide on the basis of general principles of law or equity.

4. The intervention by the arbitration court with respect to the demand presented concerned … the method of fulfilment of the performance demanded. In procedural law there are no more specific rules of a fundamental nature referring to ruling on the manner of fulfilling the performance demanded in the statement of claim by several persons. The case law permits a certain intervention by the court here, e.g. awarding the demanded amount in solidum instead of jointly and severally, and vice versa. … From the point of view of the principle that it is up to the parties to frame their demands [dyspozytywność] it is essential that the identity of the subject of the demand be maintained, and the scope and factual grounds justifying upholding the demand. With respect to the demand that was asserted, the arbitration award maintained the identity of the debtor and the creditor, the type of relief, its amount and indivisibility, and also the factual grounds justifying granting the relief.

5. The essence of this agreement [a consortium] is at least similar to the agreement of an ordinary partnership [spółka cywilna], and sometimes contains the essential elements thereof, which justifies application of the regulations governing ordinary partnerships as relevant to the relations between members of the consortium, including the regulations concerning joint commonality [wspólność łączna]. … It does not violate the public policy clause for the arbitration court to award damages to three entities “jointly” despite the lack of a legal relationship among these entities creating joint commonality among them.

6. The arbitration court’s ruling on the basis of the regulations of applicable law, if the parties do not provide otherwise (Civil Procedure Code Art. 1194 § 1), is one of the fundamental principles of procedure before the arbitration court. Therefore violation of this principle by the arbitration court may be asserted as an allegation of violation of Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 § 1 (4). Under this allegation, however, the state court cannot be expected to review the substantive correctness of the award issued by the arbitration court.

7. The position that suffering injury as a result of non-performance or improper performance of an obligation arising out of a contract does not justify wilful satisfaction of the claim for damages out of the established security, contrary to the conditions agreed with the counterparty, does not violate fundamental principles of the legal order, i.e. the principles of the rule of law (Constitution Art. 2), protection of property rights and equality of counterparties cooperating with one another (Constitution Art. 20), economic liberty (Constitution Art. 22), and equality before the law (Constitution Art. 32(2)).

1. Even though (if the parties did not agree otherwise) the arbitral tribunal shall resolve a dispute applying the regulations of substantive law applicable to the legal relationship, violation of substantive law by the arbitral tribunal is grounds for a petition to set aside the award only if as a result of the violation, the award is contrary to fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland. In other words, if despite a violation of substantive law the award cannot be said to be contrary to fundamental principles of the legal order, the mere violation cannot constitute an effective basis for demanding that the award be set aside.

2. The construction of a petition to set aside an arbitration award indicates that this measure is not used to conduct substantive review by the state court of the correctness of the resolution by the arbitral tribunal, similar to appellate review in judicial proceedings.

3. An award is contrary to fundamental principles of the legal order when this concerns constitutional principles of the socio-economic system or leading principles governing specific fields of substantive law. The fundamental principles of the legal order constituting the basis for evaluation of an arbitration award should be understood not only as constitutional norms, but also the leading norms in specific fields of law. … The procedural legal order may be the basis for evaluation of an arbitration award in two aspects. First, the compliance of the procedure which led to issuance of the arbitration award with fundamental procedural principles of the legal order is subject to evaluation. Second, the consequences of the arbitration award from the point of view of their compliance with the procedural public order are subject to evaluation, i.e., whether they are reconcilable with the system of procedural law, e.g. whether they violate res judicata or the rights of third parties.

4. A party forfeits the right to challenge an arbitration award through a petition to set aside the award due to failure to raise objections to an arbitrator subject, in the party’s view, to removal, if the party did not demand removal in the proceeding before the arbitral tribunal.

5. The requirements established for persons serving as arbitrator should be combined with the entitlement of a party to the proceeding to obtain knowledge about any potential ties between the arbitrator and the entities appearing in the proceeding. Generally it is left to the party to evaluate whether the circumstances constitute grounds for a decision whether to select an arbitrator or a decision to challenge the arbitrator. In this sense, the arbitrator’s own assessment is irrelevant, as the essence of the fairness of the procedure is connected with external evaluations made by others.

6. Indeed, the right to a fair trial provided in Art. 45(1) of the Polish Constitution, an element of which is consideration of the case by an independent court in a fairly conducted proceeding, does fall within the fundamental principles of the legal order whose violation the state court must examine at its own initiative. However, it is indicated in the case law and the legal literature that Art. 45 of the Constitution does not apply at all to arbitration, only the state courts.

7. The institution of recusal of a judge is provided for by the Civil Procedure Code both in proceedings before the state court and in proceedings before an arbitration court. The fundamental difference in the regulation of this institution is that in a proceeding before an arbitration court, the code does not provide for removal of the arbitrator or presiding arbitrator by operation of law, as is the case with respect to a judge in proceedings before the state court (Civil Procedure Code Art. 48). The grounds for challenging an arbitrator indicated in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1174 §2 are circumstances raising justified doubts as to his impartiality or independence, as well as lack of qualifications specified in the parties’ agreement. The grounds for recusal of a judge listed in Art. 48 and 49 do not apply to challenge of an arbitrator, but in interpreting the concept of circumstances raising justified doubts as to impartiality or independence Art. 48 and 49 may have auxiliary application. In a proceeding before a state court, under Civil Procedure Code Art. 379(4), participation by a judge recused by operation of law becomes grounds for the invalidity of the proceeding and constitutes grounds to vacate the judgment by the appellate court, as well as by the Supreme Court, and this ground shall be considered by both of these courts at their own initiative (Civil Procedure Code Art. 378 §2 and 39311). … The Civil Procedure Code does not provide for such absolute invalidity in proceedings before an arbitration court. If a party did not challenge an arbitrator or presiding arbitrator despite possessing knowledge of the grounds for challenge, there are no legal grounds to challenge the arbitration award. As an exception only, participation in an arbitration panel by an arbitrator or presiding arbitrator whose rights and obligations could be affected by the result in the case could constitute grounds for setting aside the award, which did not occur in this case. This is because violation of the principle that no one can be a judge in his own case (nemo in re sua judex) would undoubtedly conflict with the fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland.

1. Pursuant to Civil Procedure Code Art. 1215 §1, the court shall rule on recognition or enforcement of an arbitration award issued abroad or a settlement concluded before an arbitration court abroad after conducting a hearing. This provision confirms the rule provided for adversarial proceedings in Civil Procedure Code Art. 148 §1 that cases are considered at a hearing. A departure from this rule should be interpreted narrowly. Therefore, if a provision specifies the type of cases that are considered at a hearing, this method of consideration applies regardless of whether the court upholds the claim (or application) or denies it.

2. The [New York] Convention sets forth the material conditions for recognition (primarily in Art. IV and V), and therefore a proceeding for recognition of a foreign arbitration award should be conducted primarily in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Convention, and on the basis of the Civil Procedure Code in other respects not governed there.

3. The requirements with respect to the form of conclusion of an arbitration agreement should be assessed according to the [New York] Convention, and not according to Civil Procedure Code Art. 1162.

4. A liberal interpretation of [New York Convention Art. II(2)] is accepted in practice, recognizing that the enumeration therein of methods of concluding an agreement is not exhaustive, but also includes other techniques used for reaching agreement at a distance.

5. It should be accepted that the law of the state in which an arbitration award was issued should decide on the issue of certification of the contents of the award.

6. The view that failure to enclose the documents specified in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1213 with an application for recognition does not constitute a formal defect that is subject to supplementation pursuant to Civil Procedure Code Art. 130 §1 in connection with Art. 13 §2 is incorrect.

7. The respondent was not named in the arbitration award, but only the business name under which he trades was stated. The correctness and effectiveness of such identification should be decided by the law of the state of origin of the award.

1. Review of an arbitration award by the state court cannot turn into a full consideration of the merits of the dispute submitted to arbitration for resolution. Nonetheless, the obligation to examine whether the challenged award violates fundamental principles of the legal order usually cannot be conducted properly without the state court’s reference to the case file. Sticking only to the wording of the arbitration award itself would render such review illusory.

2. Unlike the state court, the arbitration court is not bound to apply the law strictly, even if the parties have not authorized it to resolve the dispute under principles of equity. The only limitation on the arbitration court in this respect is the fundamental principles of the legal order (for example the principle of the compensatory nature of liability in damages and the principle of protection of property rights). Not every violation of substantive law by an arbitration court, nor every erroneous interpretation or improper application or failure to apply a legal norm may be held to be a violation of fundamental principles of the legal order.

3. The rule expressed in Civil Code Art. 379 §1 of the separateness of performance is not one of the rules whose violation would conflict with the foundations of the legal order of the Republic of Poland. It suffices to point out that the parties to the agreement may exclude this rule by providing for solidarity among the creditors (Civil Code Art. 369 in connection with Art. 367 §1).

4. An objection of the lack of jurisdiction of the arbitration court is subject to preclusion if it is not asserted within the time indicated in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 §2. In that case, a petition to set aside the arbitration award can no longer effectively rely on the basis set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(1). In the event of assertion of the objection of lack of jurisdiction, the arbitration court may rule on its own jurisdiction in a separate order, but that is left to its discretion. If the arbitration court is convinced of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, it may also consider the case on the merits without first issuing an order concerning the asserted objections to its jurisdiction. In the latter case, it is obvious that a party may base its petition to set aside the arbitration award on the allegation of violation of Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(1), because it did not previously have any possibility of presenting this objection to the state court for its review. It is different in the case of issuance by the arbitration court of an order overruling the objection of its lack of jurisdiction. Then the parties may seek a ruling by the state court within 14 days after service of the order on them. The judicial proceedings in this respect are at two instances (Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 §3).

5. A party which has exhausted the procedure specified in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 §3 cannot later, in a petition to set aside the award, again assert the objection of the absence of an arbitration agreement or its invalidity or ineffectiveness. This conclusion may be drawn from Civil Procedure Code Art. 365 §1 in connection with Art. 1207 §2 or in connection with Art. 13 §2. … Referring the order of the arbitration court to the court of first instance, and then the party’s failure to file an interlocutory appeal against an order against it, also closes the path to reassertion of the objection of the lack of jurisdiction of the arbitration court on the grounds indicated in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(1). There are no grounds for distinguishing the litigation stance of a party which exhausted the recourse to both instances and a party which did not file an interlocutory appeal against the order of the court of first instance, and in consequence the order obtained finality. In both cases the legally final orders are binding on the parties and the courts pursuant to Civil Procedure Code Art. 365 §1.

6. A party that sought a ruling on jurisdiction pursuant to Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 §3 and obtained an unfavourable order from the state court cannot assert the same objections under Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(1), regardless of whether the state court ruled at one or both instances.

7. The law essentially equalizes—in terms of legal consequences—the failure to assert the objection of lack of jurisdiction of the arbitration court within the time indicated in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 §2 with the respondent’s inclination (consent) to consideration of the case by the arbitration court. An interpretation accepting the preclusion specified in Art. 1180 §2 but at the same time permitting non-recourse to the procedure for judicial review set forth in Art. 1180 §3 and accepting the possibility of not disputing the jurisdictional order of the arbitration court until the petition to set aside the award would be an inconsistent interpretation and largely eliminate the benefits for both parties to the arbitration proceeding flowing from the 2005 amendment to the Civil Procedure Code.

8. In its review, the state court cannot re-evaluate the evidence to determine whether it would have made the same factual findings as those presented in the arbitration award under review. Disputing the arbitration award in this respect would be possibly only if the defects founds were so fundamental that they would qualify as a violation of fundamental principles of civil procedure. Evaluation of the award in terms of the fundamental principles of substantive law must not be turned into appellate review.

1. The rule of the binding force of legally final judicial rulings, as an element of the values protected under the Constitution and in the international order making up a state governed by the rule of law, which the Republic of Poland is, is included among the fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland.

2. The state judicial system and arbitration are not identical. The lack of identity does not mean, however, that arbitration courts, and particularly their rulings, are irrelevant for the judicial system. While it is true that under Art. 175 of the Constitution, justice is dispensed by the state courts, it should be clearly stressed that as part of the dispensation of justice, the state courts oversee the activity of arbitration courts, and more precisely the rulings issued by them.

3. A ruling by a state court on recognition or enforcement of an arbitration award results in ascribing to the award the same force that rulings of state courts have, which is clearly confirmed by Civil Procedure Code Art. 1212 §1. This means that such a ruling, thanks to the state court ruling connected with it, must be treated in legal dealings the same as any other ruling of a state court. ... If an arbitration ruling has the same force as a ruling of a state court, this means that Civil Procedure Code Art. 365 §1 [i.e. preclusive effect] applies to it. Civil Procedure Code Art. 1212 does not provide for any exceptions from the equivalence of the effects of the arbitration court ruling to a state court ruling.

4. If the parties and the arbitration court appointed by them wish the ruling of the arbitration court to be equivalent in its effects to a state court ruling, they must take into consideration that the arbitration court has already ruled preclusively in the same matter between the same parties. If the prior ruling by the arbitration court has already been recognized or enforced by the state court, this has fundamental significance for the ability to recognize a further ruling issued between the same parties. A state court which is ruling on recognition or enforcement of a further ruling may not ignore the fact that the state court has already spoken on the same matter. In other words, the court will be bound by the ruling of the state court that recognized or enforced the prior arbitration court ruling.

5. It follows from Civil Procedure Code Art. 365 §1 that a court ruling on recognition of a second arbitration ruling, being bound by the prior ruling also by a state court, should not permit two rulings to be found in legal circulation which decided the same preclusive issue differently in the same matter between the same parties.

6. The lack of a basis to apply the regulations on a proceeding upon a petition to reopen [a legally final judgment] directly to assessment of an arbitration award, and on the other hand the lack in Polish law of a regulation for reopening a proceeding with respect to arbitration awards, cannot result in the unfettered discretion of an arbitration court in determining whether to take into consideration an earlier award in which a certain issue was already preclusively ruled on between the same parties. … If the arbitration court expects its award to be recognized, it should take into consideration the prior resolution of the preclusive issue in the award that was already recognized with legal finality by the state court. When examining the permissibility of a departure from this rule, the court in a proceeding to set aside an arbitration award may not rely on the mere assertion by the arbitration court that new facts or evidence has appeared in the case, but should determine, applying as relevant the criteria for assessment developed in the context of the legal regulations for reopening of a proceeding concluded in a legally final judgment, whether they are truly new facts and evidence, and whether the party could have asserted them in the prior proceeding.

1. Factual findings by the arbitration court are generally binding on the state court hearing a petition by a party dissatisfied with the resolution of the case by the arbitration court. The proceeding before the state court is not in the nature of the review proper to a common court of second instance, however, but is limited to the grounds expressly stated by the regulations, which are the permissible legal grounds for a petition to set aside an arbitration award (Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §§ 1 and 2).

2. Only if the state court finds that the [evidentiary] procedure was not conducted at all or was conducted incompletely, or was clearly conducted defectively, in violation of the rules of logical understanding and linking of facts in a chain of cause and effect, with selective admission of evidence in the case, admitting evidence only from one side, excluding without justification evidence offered by the opposing side, and the like, may it be found that the requirements referred to in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(4) were not met. ... This provision should be interpreted narrowly, limiting the possibility of upsetting an arbitration award to the principles of a fair trial and procedural violations that could have an effect on the arbitration award.

3. The defendant’s argument that the principles of civil liability for injury do not belong to the fundamental principles of the legal order in Poland cannot be sustained. Under the civil law, and thus in private legal relationships, as a result of various events—particularly dangerous acts, acts arising out of commercial activity, vehicular traffic, as well as legal acts—the occurrence of injury is of universal dimensions and requires legal regulations guaranteeing liability in damages. Regulations in this respect belong to the fundamental norms of the law of obligations, and under tort liability and contractual liability may be regarded as forming some of the fundamental principles of the legal order of the state.

4. Art. 45 of the Polish Constitution does not refer at all to arbitration, but only to the state courts.

1. An arbitration award may be said to be contrary to the fundamental principles of the legal order … only with respect to constitutional principles of the socio-economic system or the leading principles governing specific fields of substantive law.

2. The defectiveness of an arbitration award consisting of violation of fundamental principles of the legal order must appear from the wording of the ruling as such, and not from violation of the regulations for procedure before the arbitration court.

3. The fundamental principles of the legal order, constituting the basis for assessment of an arbitration award, should be understood to include not only constitutional norms, but also the leading norms in specific fields of law.

4. Consideration of a petition [to set aside an arbitration award] generally does not include a review of the consistency of the arbitration award with substantive law, a review of whether the award is supported by the facts cited in the justification for the award, or whether such facts were properly established, although of course a ruling based on a selective, unreliable assessment of the evidence does violate the rule of law.

1. A petition to set aside an arbitration award is an extraordinary means of review of arbitration rulings by the state court. It is not an appeal, but combines the features of an extraordinary means of challenge with a claim to establish a right or legal relationship. But it cannot be agreed that it is a type of appeal or means of challenge.

2. The list of grounds for a petition to set aside an arbitration award provided in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §§ 1 and 2 are exhaustive in nature; that is, the court may not set aside an arbitration award for reasons other than those set forth in this provision. It should nonetheless be pointed out that one of the grounds for the petition—the public policy clause—is in the nature of a general clause, which means that the list of circumstances which may justify setting aside an award is not closed.

3. Not every violation of the rules for procedure before the arbitration court established by the parties or arising under the code should result in setting aside an arbitration award. It is justified to accept by way of interpretation that the fundamental rules of procedure are those whose violation could have an effect on the result in the proceeding before the arbitration court in the specific case.

4. With respect to review of arbitration awards, the purpose of the public policy clause is to protect the national legal system against resolutions that are incompatible with the system. The resolution by the arbitration court, understood as an individual and concrete norm expressed in the arbitration award, as well as the method by which it was issued, is subject to assessment from the point of view of compatibility with the fundamental principles of the legal system.

5. The state court does not review the correctness of the arbitrators’ resolution, but it must examine and assess it in order to review the compatibility of the resolution with public policy. In other words, the state court should—at least insofar as the allegation of incompatibility [with public policy] arises—create a model of the ruling which in its opinion is correct, and then compare that to the arbitrators’ resolution, in order to determine whether the nature and scale of the inconsistency justifies the allegation of violation of public policy.

6. A gross and obvious discrepancy between the facts appearing from the arbitration case file (or facts that are commonly known or known to the state court in its official capacity) and the facts assumed as the basis for the award may not remain entirely beyond the scope of interest of the state court.

7. In the meaning of consistency with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the Republic of Poland, the point of the Parliament was not that a ruling be consistent with all regulations of Polish law, but only that there be consistency with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the Republic of Poland.

8. The principle of the enforceability of contracts belongs to the group of fundamental principles of the Polish legal system. It is not absolute in nature, however, and is subject to a number of statutory exceptions. One of them is Civil Code Art. 5, setting forth the notion of abuse of a subjective right.

9. The principle of estoppel (venire contra factum proprium) and the clean-hands doctrine are not counted among the fundamental principles of arbitration court procedure and are not recognized as a part of the legal system of the Republic of Poland.

10. The rule of impartiality leads the arbitrators to maintain an impartial attitude toward the case and the participants in the proceeding. In turn, the formal equality of the parties is manifest in the right to be heard and equal procedural measures. The principle of equality in the proceeding before the arbitration court has two aspects: hearing out the parties by the arbitration court, and the opportunity to present their allegations and evidence to support them (the opportunity to use the same procedural measures). The principle of directness requires that evidence be taken before the full panel of the arbitration court.

11. If no injury was caused, awarding damages should be regarded as inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the Republic of Poland.

1. In a petition to set aside an arbitration award, review of the merits of the case decided by the arbitration court is excluded.

2. Fundamental principles of the legal order should be understood to mean not only fundamental principles of the social and political system, reflected in constitutional principles, but also the overriding principles governing specific fields of law. … Examples that have been held to be violations of the fundamental principles of the legal order within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §2(2) include violation of the principle of the autonomy of civil-law entities and the principle of economic liberty, awarding damages where no injury has been suffered, or accepting the effectiveness of setoff under conditions in which specific regulations exclude such possibility.

1. A petition to set aside an arbitration award is an extraordinary means of review intended to set aside the award if at least one of the grounds exhaustively set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 is justified.

2. When considering a petition [to set aside an arbitration award], the state court is bound by the grounds alleged by the petitioner. Only two of the grounds set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §2 are considered on the court’s motion: the non-arbitrability if the dispute and inconsistency of the arbitration award with the fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland.

3. The assessment of whether an arbitration award is contrary to fundamental principles of the legal order is addressed to the content of the award, and not the correctness of the procedure before the arbitration court or the composition of the panel. … An arbitration award may be set aside under the public policy clause if it is found that the results included in the content of the award are not consistent with a specific norm which is regarded as one of the fundamental principles of the legal order in force in Poland. ... These principles include not only constitutional norms, but also the overriding norms in specific fields of law.

4. The requirements made of persons serving as arbitrators should be combined with a party’s right to learn about any ties the arbitrator may have to entities appearing in the proceeding. It is up to the party to evaluate such circumstances as grounds for a decision to select an arbitrator or to seek removal of an arbitrator. The arbitrator’s self-assessment is irrelevant, because the essence of a fair procedure is tied to objective judgment by others. ... The fundamental principles of the legal order include the right to a court as provided in Art. 45(1) of the Polish Constitution, an element of which is a party’s right to have its case heard by an independent court, in a fairly conducted procedure.

1. Whether a given ruling of a foreign court may be legally relevant cannot be determined in advance at the time of recognition. Thus it cannot be anticipated what effects the ruling might have or in what circumstances a given entity might rely on it in the future. Thus the petitioner is right in asserting that Civil Procedure Code Art. 1145 §1 does not provide grounds to refuse recognition of a ruling by a foreign court only because in the view of the court where recognition is sought it will not exert legal effects in Poland.

2. If the petitioner [seeking recognition] appeared as a party in a proceeding before an Austrian court, it not only has a legal interest to have standing in the recognition proceeding before the Polish court, but such interest also means that if the grounds set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1146 do not exist, it may obtain recognition of the award as effective in Poland.

3. A ruling denying a petition to set aside an arbitration award, formally speaking, is a merits decision and not only procedural. Such rulings thus, as a rule, are capable of recognition. It should be pointed out, however, that the dispute between the parties on the merits was resolved by the arbitration court, acting on the basis of the intent of the parties as expressed in the arbitration clause. The judgment in a proceeding to set aside an arbitration award is therefore only a resolution with respect to the state’s exercise of oversight of arbitration rulings.

4. A judgment by a domestic court issued in a proceeding upon a petition to set aside an arbitration award must be taken into consideration in a proceeding seeking recognition of a foreign arbitration award only when permitted by the provisions governing such proceeding. As grounds for denial of recognition, the Civil Procedure Code and the New York Convention provide only for the court in the country deciding on recognition of a foreign arbitration award to consider, upon motion of a party, a judgment setting aside the arbitration award.

5. Given the specific nature of an arbitration award, which is issued based on the intent of the parties, and the function performed by a foreign court that denies a petition to set aside an arbitration award, there is no legal basis for recognition of such judgment by the foreign court, which essentially involves only oversight and not the merits. The connection between such judgment by a foreign court and the arbitration award, and thus the not entirely independent nature of the judgment, is primarily a barrier to treating the judgment as a ruling that may be recognized in Poland under Civil Procedure Code Art. 1145 §1.

1. Violation by the arbitration court of regulations of substantive law or erroneous interpretation thereof, even if resulting in an erroneous ruling, does not in itself—even if it really did occur—constitute a violation of the fundamental principles of the legal system.

2. Civil Procedure Code Art. 1185 indicates that the consultation among the arbitrators may occur at any place (and thus even in a hospital).

3. Drawing up and signing the award is not an act that requires the preparation of minutes. As provided in §31 of the Rules [of the Court of Arbitration at the Polish Chamber of Commerce], minutes are prepared of a hearing and any act of the arbitration court. The mere physical drawing up of the text of the award is not an act of the arbitration court; it is a technical, auxiliary act, which may be performed by only one person at a time. Signing of the award, which is an act addressed to the members of the panel of arbitrators, should be analyzed similarly. Placement of a signature by each of the arbitrators is the act of the arbitrator alone, not of the panel of arbitrators. It thus does not require the preparation of minutes, which is reserved for an act of the entire arbitration court.

4. Only a violation of the “fundamental” rules of procedure before the arbitration court (Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(4)) may be grounds for setting aside an arbitration award. … Issues connected with drawing up the minutes of the consultation among the arbitrators and issuance of the award cannot be regarded as belonging to this group. Even if minutes of these actions actually should have been prepared, the lack thereof would not mean that a “fundamental” rule of procedure had been violated, but only a rule of order.

1. [When the state court has set aside an arbitration award] it is necessary for the claimant to file a new claim before a new arbitration court, or at least a written declaration of assertion before such arbitration court of the claims in the previous scope or as amended. From such time (or, currently, from the date of service of such document on the opposing party, Civil Procedure Code Art. 1186), a new proceeding is commenced before the arbitration court which is not a continuation of the previous proceeding that resulted in the arbitration award that was set aside.

2. The petition to set aside the arbitration award ... dated 16 December 2006, filed under the new regulations, commenced a case before the state court to set aside the arbitration award, and under the rule set forth in Art. 2 of the amending act [Act dated 28 July 2005 Amending the Civil Procedure Code (Journal of Laws Dz.U. No. 178 item 1478)] it was conducted in accordance with the new regulations. This means that the petitioner should base it in procedural respects on the new regulations for such procedure provided in Part Five, Title VII of the Civil Procedure Code; however, because the subject of the petition is the award and the proceeding before the arbitration court conducted in accordance with the former regulations, on substantive legal grounds the petition may rely only on the former rules, because the arbitration court was required to apply those rules and not the new ones. The grounds for the petition should thus be based on the former regulations.

3. In light of the circumstances of conclusion of the agreement, its purpose, and the statements by the attorneys before the arbitration court ... and failure for nearly five years to assert the lack of an arbitration clause, the intent of the parties ... was, as correctly found by the courts of both instances, to submit disputes arising under the agreement to the arbitration court for resolution, and not only mediation. … This position ... does not lead to validation of the lack of an arbitration clause by the behaviour of the parties before the arbitration court and the state courts or to avoidance of the requirement for written form of an arbitration clause, but constitutes only an interpretation of the declarations of will of the parties concerning an unclear arbitration clause expressed in written form and made ... in accordance with the requirements of Civil Code Art. 65.

4. An arbitration court is not a “court” or “other state body or body of the public administration” within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code Art. 365 §1, nor is there another “instance provided by statute” in which an arbitration court is bound by the award by another arbitration court, even concerning the same parties and the same claims.

5. An arbitration award, insofar as it denies a petition in some part with legal finality, does not have res judicata effect within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code Art. 365.

1. The schedule of fees for actions of the arbitration court constituting an annex to the rules of the court in force from 1 January 2000, which does not require payment of an arbitration fee on a defence of setoff, was applicable to the case decided by the arbitration court. … As the arbitration court failed to consider the defence of setoff because of failure to pay the arbitration fee, the allegation in the appeal that the procedure before the arbitration court was not observed in the arbitration proceeding is correct. … In consequence, it should be held that the petition to set aside the arbitration award on the basis of Civil Procedure Code Art. 712 §1(3) is justified by the wording of this provision.

2. Submission of the dispute existing between the parties for resolution by the arbitration court does not justify the conclusion that the parties waive the right to a fair and thorough procedure assuring the ability to satisfy the legal interests of the parties which are worthy of protection. The right to a fair procedure is a pillar of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, and for these reasons violation of such right justifies the conclusion that the rule of law was violated. This will be the case more specifically in the event of failure to consider the defence of setoff asserted by the party as a result of the arbitration court’s application of a regulation that was not in force with respect to payment of a fee as a condition for consideration of the motion. The principle of fair procedure requires consideration of the defence of setoff duly asserted by the respondent.

1. The constitutive elements of an arbitration award are defined by Civil Procedure Code Art. 708 §1, which is a regulation of mandatory applicability. One of these elements is a resolution of the demands of the parties (Art. 708 §1(4)). Thus it should be accepted that any ruling by the arbitration court containing the indicated elements, including a resolution of the demands of the parties, constitutes an arbitration award within the meaning of Book Three of the Civil Procedure Code, regardless of the form given to the ruling by the arbitration court.

2. In its case law, the Supreme Court has stressed on numerous occasions that the type of appellate instrument must be determined by the subject of the resolution, and not the form which the court gave to the ruling. ... This view applies also to rulings by an arbitration court.

1. The defectiveness of an arbitration award in violating the rule of law must appear from the very wording of the ruling, and not from violation of regulations concerning proceedings before such court. Procedural violations might justify only some other ground for setting aside the arbitration award.

2. The minimum requirements that must be met by the justification for an arbitration award are set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 708 §1(5). If the grounds by which the arbitration court was guided when ruling on the demands of the parties may be deduced from the justification, that is sufficient for these requirements to be deemed to be satisfied.

3. The view cannot be accepted ... that the duty to conduct a thorough investigation of the circumstances necessary to resolve the case (Civil Procedure Code Art. 705 §2, third sentence) is performed by assessing the allegations of the parties and indicating why some of them are found to be valid and others not. Such assessment is made at the stage of making the ruling, and is expressed in the justification for the ruling made. Investigation of the circumstances that are relevant (essential) to the case occurs at an earlier phase of the proceeding and consists of hearing the parties, permitting them to submit statements with respect to the motions and allegations of the opposing party and the result of the evidentiary proceedings, and finally receiving evidence necessary to illuminate the circumstances essential to resolve the case.

Refusal to sign an award, which is contrary to the assumptions of the procedure before the arbitration court and may, for example, result in liability to the parties for loss, should be stated expressly and not done in an implicit manner.

A finding that an award is inconsistent with the facts does not always result in setting aside the award. It is accepted that an application alleging violation of the rule of law is justified when the effect of an arbitration award conflicts with fundamental principles of the legal order of the state.

1. Pursuant to Civil Procedure Code Art. 712 §1(4), an arbitration award may be set aside if the ruling on the demands of the parties violates the rule of law or principles of social coexistence. This provision enacts a general clause representing the principle of domestic public policy. This means that violation or incorrect interpretation of substantive law, and the resulting defect of the ruling, in and of itself does not constitute a violation of the rule of law. A violation of substantive law must be such that it would result in issuance of a ruling that would by its content violate fundamental principles of the rule of law, particularly situations where a ruling is issued using an institution that is impermissible by operation of law.

2. Incorrect interpretation of substantive law and other violations not rising to such level cannot lead to a finding that the grounds for the petition set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 712 §1(4) have been met.

1. A petition to set aside an arbitration award is not ... an appeal, but a procedural measure with a nature similar to a petition to reopen a proceeding.

2. The statement in the second sentence of Civil Procedure Code Art. 705 §2 that an arbitration court is not bound by civil procedure regulations does not refer to mandatorily applicable regulations set forth in Book Three of the code. Civil Procedure Code Art. 712–715, which have this character, apply in every arbitration proceeding. The lack of any indication to this effect in the rules defining the procedure before the arbitration court therefore does not exclude the permissibility of filing a petition with the state court to set aside an award issued by a permanent arbitration court (Civil Procedure Code Art. 695).

An arbitration award issued during the German occupation pursuant to an arbitration clause concluded by the parties despite the non-existence of a dispute between them but only in order to ascribe the legal form to an agreement which according to Polish law requires the form of a public document does not violate public policy.

The fact that an execution clause has not been affixed to an arbitration award in accordance with Civil Procedure Code Art. 594(2) and Execution Ordinance §54(3) has only the negative consequence that the plaintiffs may not enforce their claim by way of execution before obtaining such clause, due to the lack of a writ of enforcement (Civil Procedure Code Art. 540), but this does not affect the fact that the claim adjudged by such award remains due and payable, or the right to setoff, which is based on the Obligations Code rather than the [Civil Procedure] Code provisions concerning judicial execution proceedings.

1. Civil Procedure Code Art. 150, which permits service at night only upon prior order by the director of the court, does not apply to arbitration procedure, where the general regulation of Civil Procedure Code Art. 500 §1 provides only that the arbitration court shall serve copies of the award on the parties, against written proof of service, but does not prescribe the manner of service.

2. Obligations Code Art. 82 permits an agreement to pay a specific sum of money in the event of failure to perform an obligation, and thus the arbitration court did not violate public policy by ruling on a monetary penalty....

3. The allegation that the arbitration award does not explain the grounds for monetary obligations is unjustified, because the parties released the arbitration court from the duty to provide a justification for the award.

1. If the parties have not specified the procedure, the arbitration court shall specify the procedure in its own discretion. In this respect, the arbitration court is not subject to any restrictions other than those set forth in the act ([Civil Procedure Code] Art. 503 §1(3)), i.e. in the regulations concerning procedure before the arbitration court (Art. 497–502). These regulations do not require the arbitration court to specify its procedure in writing, nor do they prohibit the arbitration court from changing the procedure it has adopted for another procedure, and, finally, they do not prohibit the arbitration court from departing in certain instances from the procedure it has previously specified.

2. The place of issuance of an award is the place identified by the arbitration court in the award. Stating as this place the place in which the award was handed down within the meaning of [Civil Procedure Code] Art. 497 is recommended; however, so long as the arbitration court is not bound by the procedure specified by the parties themselves (Art. 494 §1), it may determine in its own discretion which place to identify in the award as the place of issuance of the award, so long as it is not contrary to the rule set forth in Art. 497. Such a decision by the arbitration court may fall within the scope of specifying the procedure.

3. The regulations in the act concerning procedure before the arbitration court ([Civil Procedure Code] Art. 494–502) do not contain provisions on announcement of the award, and it may thus be issued without announcement. Nor does the act tie any consequences to announcement of the award, which it does not provide for announcement of at all. Consequences are, however, tied to service of copies of the award, as specified in Art. 500 §1, and under Art. 504 §1 a petition to set aside an arbitration award must be filed within one month after service of the award. The date of issuance of an award is therefore not the date of its announcement.

4. The very act of issuance of an award by the arbitration court is not identical with signing of the written formulation of the resolution of the relief sought by the parties and the reasons for the resolution. Both the literal wording and the substance of the provisions set forth in [Civil Procedure Code] Art. 498 and 499 lead to the conclusion that the time of issuance of an award is the time when the arbitration court took a final decision on what the resolution of the relief sought by the parties would be, and for what reasons, and when to this end the award was handed down within the meaning of Art. 497. The award is not yet in force, but enters into force only when it is made in writing, contains all the information required by Art. 498, and is signed by the arbitrators in the manner provided in Art. 499; nonetheless, the award already exists, it has already been “handed down” and thus was “issued.”

1. Civil Procedure Code Art. 503 §1 is limited to an enumeration of the grounds for setting aside an arbitration award, while Art. 505 requires the regulations concerning a proceeding initiated by a statement of claim to be applied in a proceeding upon a petition to set aside an arbitration award. It follows from this that Civil Procedure Code Art. 408 §2 and Art. 437 concerning partial setting aside of a judgment are also applicable to arbitration awards.

2. The substance of the arbitration award determines whether in the given instance it may be set aside in part and to what extent, obviously within the bounds of Civil Procedure Code Art. 503 §1. Partial setting aside of an award will not be permissible if the specific parts of the award are interconnected in such a way that none of them may be removed from the others without materially deforming the whole. If, however, the arbitration court exceeded the bounds of the arbitration clause (Civil Procedure Code Art. 503 §1(4)), and the ruling in this regard may without harm be separated from the rest of the award, there is no barrier preventing partial setting aside of the award.

3. The parties could supplement the arbitration clause during the hearing before the arbitration court, but because of the requirement for written form of the clause (Civil Procedure Code Art. 480 §2), such supplementation would also have to be made in that form, and thus in the minutes signed by the parties.

4. The state court is competent to consider only formal grounds for setting aside an arbitration award, except that it will also consider in substantive terms whether the award violates public policy or good practice (Civil Procedure Code Art. 503 §1(4)).

5. Waiver of the right to challenge the award would have to be express in order to be effective, and the plaintiff’s statement that it accepts the award does not satisfy this requirement, and in any event was made to the arbitration court and not to the defendant.

Under Civil Procedure Code Art. 501 §2 and Art. 502, an arbitration award has the weight of a judicial ruling and is equivalent to a state court judgment. Because pursuant to Art. 82 §2 of the Notaries Law judicial rulings effectively take the place of the form of a notarial deed, the arbitration award is thus valid and effective despite the absence of the form of a notarial deed, and does not violate public policy, because it was issued in compliance with applicable regulations of law.

1. Civil Procedure Code Art. 503 provides for the ability to set aside an arbitration award only in exceptional circumstances, and such provisions are subject to strict rather than expansive interpretation. As a result, in case of doubt, the award should be maintained in force rather than set aside.

2. It follows from the concept of “resolution” that an award by an arbitration court should be of a type that definitively ends the dispute, and from which it will be apparent in what manner the dispute was resolved, so that any doubts or potential further disputes in this respect are excluded.

1. From the perspective of Austrian civil procedure regulations, failure to submit the original arbitration clause to the arbitration court does not justify ineffectiveness of the arbitration award, as this result follows under § 595(1) of the [former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code only from lack of an arbitration clause.

2. The state court is not a higher instance with respect to the arbitration court, and thus determinations made by the arbitration court within its discretion may not be appealed against.

3. The lack of justification of an arbitration award is not included in § 595 of the [former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code as grounds for ineffectiveness of the arbitration award.

The finding ... that the parties entered into an arbitration clause and obtained an arbitration award with the intention of circumventing regulations of law imposing requirements for transfer of ownership is sufficient grounds to refuse to issue a writ of enforcement (Zw. Pr. Vol. X, Part 1, Art. 1528).

If the parties do not appear at the time set for announcement of the arbitration award, or if the award was not announced to the parties, the award is deemed to be announced on the last day of the period set for issuance of the award.

Lack of a signature on the award by an arbitrator who has been outvoted cannot be grounds for invalidating the arbitration award.

1. An arbitrator may not be ordered to sign the arbitration award by resort to the courts. Such a procedure is not provided for by the civil procedure code, which in a separate chapter governs the entire proceeding before the arbitration court. It only imposes an obligation on an arbitrator who fails to perform the duties connected with accepting the role of an arbitrator to redress the loss caused by such failure.

2. Signing of the arbitration award that has been handed down is the same obligation as the obligation to issue an award, as the signature is an essential requirement for the effectiveness of the arbitration award.

An arbitration clause signed for a joint-stock company by only one commercial proxy is invalid if a signature for the company by a single person is not provided for in the commercial register.

What is relevant for the content of an arbitration award is only the wording of the award, not the intent of particular arbitrators.

An arbitration award may be effective only for or against a person who in a written document has submitted a disputed right or disputed legal relationship to determination by the arbitration court.

The date of issuance of the award by the arbitration court should be stated in the award itself. A subsequent declaration by the arbitrators, even though made in writing, is of no legal significance because the functions of the arbitration court cease entirely upon issuance of the award (Art. 1394 of the [former Russian] Civil Procedure Code). Nor is it permissible to admit the testimony of witnesses in order to determine the date of the arbitration award. The infraction committed by the arbitration court in omitting the date does not invalidate the award if the award was filed with the state court prior to the end of the period in which the award was supposed to made and it is confirmed through this procedure that the deadline was not missed.

A clause providing for a panel composed of two arbitrators in the event that one of the arbitrators refuses to take part in the hearing and issuance of the award is legally possible and effective, but in that case the two arbitrators would have to conduct the hearing and issue the award. Then, without a doubt, only the two arbitrators holding sessions and deciding the case would be required to sign the arbitration award (§592 of the [former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code).

1. The Supreme Court does not share the legal view that because of dispatch and service of a copy of the arbitration award on the plaintiff after 10 May 1927, the award in question should be regarded as not having been issued during the period specified in the submission to arbitration, and thus invalid. Because the award was adopted by all three arbitrators and signed by them prior to 10 May 1927, the award must be regarded as issued on time, regardless of when it was served on the parties.

2. The award in question is invalid because the plaintiff was not heard by all three arbitrators prior to resolution of the case covered by the submission to arbitration.

1. It cannot be assumed that the parties, when not only certain of their rights and obligations arising out of the legal act in question are challenged, but the legal act as such, did not intend to make use of the assistance of the arbitration court. Therefore, despite the invalidity (not to mention the ineffectiveness) of the deed itself, the arbitration clause, only mechanically connected to the deed, remains in force.

2. Unless otherwise provided by the parties, the arbitration court is not bound by procedural regulations, particularly the provisions of the [former German] Civil Procedure Code, when hearing the case submitted to it.

3. An arbitration award must set forth the reasons; that is, it must contain an objective justification for the operative wording of the award issued. Whether such justification is accurate, exhaustive or consistent with the state of facts cannot be reviewed by the common court under §1041 of the [former German] Civil Procedure Code, because it is not an appellate instance with respect to the arbitration court.

1. While the arbitration court is not bound in its procedure by civil procedure regulations ([former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code § 587), nonetheless the bounds of the task of the arbitration court must be designated (see [former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code § 595(5)).

 2. In the absence of the defendant (in an arbitration court) the relief sought may not be amended and arbitrarily determined relief granted against the defendant without notice to the defendant. … Such procedure violates the mandatorily applicable rule of [former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code § 587 of the necessity to hear out the parties or give them at least the opportunity of a defence, and renders the arbitration award ineffective ([former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code § 595 (2) and (5)).

In order for the court to permit execution, evidence must be presented to the court that an arbitration award constituting a writ of enforcement was issued by a properly appointed arbitration court, and such evidence is presented by the submission to arbitration, constituting in the given instance an integral part of the writ of enforcement.

1. An arbitration court is not a state institution, but operates on the basis of an agreement by the parties ([former Russian] Civil Procedure Code Art. 1367), and thus the regulations on the official language, in force in state offices, do not apply there.

2. For an award written by the arbitration court in a foreign language, in order to obtain a writ of enforcement, which must be issued only in Polish, it is necessary to submit a duly certified translation, which will serve as the basis for the judicial actions connected with issuance of a writ of enforcement and enforcement of the award.

1. A finding by the courts of two instances that an arbitration award is unenforceable is essentially a consequence of the judicially confirmed invalidity of the award, depriving it of force and effect.

2. The objective invalidity [of the arbitration award] could occur only if the scope of authority of the arbitration court was not specified at all or was extended generally, without closer description, to any and all disputes between the parties.

An arbitration award may be served on a party who has departed to a place unknown after issuance of the award, via a guardian for an absent person, appointed by the court for this purpose.

Because it was found that the petitioner had not signed the arbitration clause, through placement of her signature or her mark, it was correctly ruled that the arbitration award issued on the basis of such clause was ineffective, and with respect to both petitioners; from the nature of the legal relationship which was to be determined by the arbitration award, there is an apparent uniformity of interest for both of the petitioners.