An arbitration provision in a collective agreement would have legal effect only when the agreement was signed by both parties (§ 884 of the [former Austrian] Civil Code), or by their attorneys-in-fact “specifically” authorized to conclude the agreement (§ 1008 of the [former Austrian] Civil Code).

This provision [former Civil Procedure Law Art. 1370¹] that consideration of claims referred to in Civil Procedure Law Art. 1370 shall lie with the court which would have jurisdiction in the event of a judicial dispute should be understood as reiterating the general rule with respect to jurisdiction of the court depending on the amount sought by the plaintiff.

1. Only the arbitration court, and not a party, is authorized to submit a demand for legal assistance.

2. With respect to the form of the award and evidentiary measures, the arbitration court is not bound by civil procedure regulations.

There is no provision in the code prohibiting the parties from including a provision in a valid arbitration clause that if one of the arbitrators refuses to take part in the proceeding or sign the award, the other remaining arbitrator or arbitrators together with the presiding arbitrator shall constitute the complete arbitration court appointed in accordance with § 577 of the [former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code.

The defendant’s objection to appointment of a super-arbitrator is not justified by Civil Procedure Law Art. 1370¹, which clearly vests this right with the court, and the arbitrators’ mutual selection of the super-arbitrator is not provided for in the statute.

An arbitration award may be served on a party who has departed to a place unknown after issuance of the award, via a guardian for an absent person, appointed by the court for this purpose.

Because it was found that the petitioner had not signed the arbitration clause, through placement of her signature or her mark, it was correctly ruled that the arbitration award issued on the basis of such clause was ineffective, and with respect to both petitioners; from the nature of the legal relationship which was to be determined by the arbitration award, there is an apparent uniformity of interest for both of the petitioners.

An arbitration agreement is governed by provisions of public law, not private law. Under the regulations concerning the judicial system, a person who is formally subject to guardianship due to mental illness may not become a judge; therefore, applying this rule by analogy, a person is not capable of serving as an arbitrator who at the time of appointment as an arbitrator was formally subject to guardianship due to mental illness, notwithstanding the claim that such person was already in fact mentally fit at that time or upon issuance of the award.

1. The clear wording of the deed of purchase and sale leaves no doubt that the parties submitted to the arbitration court, in advance, all disputes which might arise out of the contract, certainly not excluding a dispute over transfer of ownership.

2. When referring in the deed to the West Prussian Chamber of Agriculture as authorized to appoint the presiding arbitrator, the parties must have had in mind, for the future, the analogous Polish institution, because the deed was concluded after signing of the Treaty of Versailles, in which Pomerania was awarded to Poland.

1. A petition to set aside an arbitration award is an extraordinary measure of judicial review by the state court of the activity of the arbitration court. It is a special legal measure combining the features of extraordinary review (against an arbitration award that is legally final, at least formally) and a claim seeking to modify the legal status brought about by the arbitration award. However, it is not an appellate measure, and the state court reviewing the petition generally will not examine the resolution of the arbitration court on the merits, and in particular will not review whether there is a foundation for the award under the cited facts or whether the facts were properly established.

2. Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(4) refers to the fundamental rules of procedure before the arbitration court, which should be understood as limiting the possibility to set aside an arbitration award only to those instances which resulted in violation of the principles of a fair trial or procedural violations important enough that they could have influenced the arbitration award, for example violation of the principle of the equality of the parties, or a complete failure to admit evidence. This situation did not occur in the proceeding before the arbitration court, as the objection by the petition referred to the arbitrators’ failure to comply with the 30-day limit for closing the proceeding in the case, late issuance of the award and service on the petitioner, and failure to comply with informational obligations with respect to the petitioner.

3. Fundamental principles of the legal order should be understood as fundamental constitutional principles concerning the socio-economic system, as well as the leading principles governing specific areas of substantive and procedural law. Thus only norms that are mandatorily binding and to which fundamental importance is ascribed may justify reliance on the public policy clause. This clause is not applied to correct all irregularities and defects in arbitration awards, but should protect the integrity of public policy.